IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Safety Net Design and Systemic Risk: New Empirical Evidence

  • Klüh, Ulrich

Recent econometric evidence has noticeably changed views on the desirability and the appropriate design of explicit Deposit Insurance Schemes (DIS). The purpose of this paper is to take a second look at the data. After surveying recent empirical work and providing a theoretical framework, we argue that existing studies may suffer from a selection bias. Building on a new database on explicit deposit insurance compiled by the author, we perform a variety of semi-parametric and parametric tests to see whether and how explicit deposit insurance (de)stabilizes banking systems. We find that the evidence indeed suggests that a selection bias is present. Controlling for this bias leads to a reassessment of recent studies. In particular, making deposit insurance explicit has a rather moderate and, if any, stabilizing effect on the probability of experiencing a systemic crisis.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/662/1/SelectionBias0505.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Munich, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 662.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Jun 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenec:662
Contact details of provider: Postal: Ludwigstr. 28, 80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-3405
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3510
Web page: http://www.vwl.uni-muenchen.de

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Reuven Glick & Xueyan Guo & Michael Hutchison, 2006. "Currency Crises, Capital-Account Liberalization, and Selection Bias," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(4), pages 698-714, November.
  2. Giammarino, Ronald M & Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1993. " An Incentive Approach to Banking Regulation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(4), pages 1523-42, September.
  3. Lee, Wai Sing & Kwok, Chuck C. Y., 2000. "Domestic and international practice of deposit insurance: a survey," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 29-62, January.
  4. Alan D. Morrison & Lucy White, 2004. "Is Deposit Insurance a Good Thing, and If So, Who Should Pay for It?," OFRC Working Papers Series 2004fe08, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
  5. von Hagen, Jürgen & Ho, Tai-kuang, 2004. "Money market pressure and the determinants of baning crises," ZEI Working Papers B 20-2004, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.
  6. Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Edward J. Kane, 2002. "Deposit Insurance Around the Globe: Where Does It Work?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 175-195, Spring.
  7. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopezde-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2000. "Government Ownership of Banks," NBER Working Papers 7620, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Kevin C. Murdock & Thomas F. Hellmann & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 147-165, March.
  9. Gary Gorton & Lixin Huang, 2002. "Bank Panics and the Endogeneity of Central Banking," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 02-29, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  10. Yuk-Shee Chan & Stuart I. Greenbaum & Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "Is Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance Possible?," Finance 0411018, EconWPA.
  11. Sergio L. Schmukler & Graciela Laura Kaminsky, 2003. "Short-Run Pain, Long-Run Gain; The Effects of Financial Liberalization," IMF Working Papers 03/34, International Monetary Fund.
  12. Pagès, H. & Santos, J., 2002. "Optimal Supervisory Policies and Depositor-Preferences Laws," Working papers 91, Banque de France.
  13. Laeven, Luc, 2004. "The political economy of deposit insurance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3247, The World Bank.
  14. De la Torre, Augusto, 2000. "Resolving bank failures in Argentina - recent developments and issues," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2295, The World Bank.
  15. Richard J. Herring & Anthony M. Santomero, 2000. "What Is Optimal Financial Regulation?," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 00-34, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  16. Matutes, Carmen & Vives, Xavier, 2000. "Imperfect competition, risk taking, and regulation in banking," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-34, January.
  17. Repullo, Rafael, 2000. "Who Should Act as Lender of Last Resort? An Incomplete Contracts Model," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 580-605, August.
  18. Dilip Madan & George Pennacchi, 2003. "Introduction: Special Issue on Pricing the Risks of Deposit Insurance," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 89-92, October.
  19. Cull, Robert & Senbet, Lemma W. & Sorge, Marco, 2001. "Deposit insurance and financial development," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2682, The World Bank.
  20. Eric Santor, 2003. "Banking Crises and Contagion: Empirical Evidence," Working Papers 03-1, Bank of Canada.
  21. Charles M. Kahn & João A.C. Santos, 2001. "Allocating bank regulatory powers: lender of last resort, deposit insurance, and supervision," Proceedings 717, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  22. Acharya, Sankarshan & Dreyfus, Jean-Francois, 1989. " Optimal Bank Reorganization Policies and the Pricing of Federal Deposit Insurance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(5), pages 1313-33, December.
  23. Matutes, Carmen & Vives, Xavier, 1996. "Competition for Deposits, Fragility, and Insurance," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 184-216, April.
  24. Francesca Carapella & Giorgio Di Giorgio, 2003. "Deposit insurance, institutions and bank interest rates," Discussion Papers 0304-06, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  25. Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December.
  26. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1998. "Liquidity risk, liquidity creation and financial fragility: a theory of banking," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Sep.
  27. Philipp Hartmann & Elena Carletti, 2002. "Competition and Stability: What's Special about Banking?," FMG Special Papers sp140, Financial Markets Group.
  28. G. G. Garcia, 1999. "Deposit Insurance; A Survey of Actual and Best Practices," IMF Working Papers 99/54, International Monetary Fund.
  29. Reint Gropp & Jukka Vesala, 2002. "Deposit insurance, moral hazard, and market monitoring," Proceedings 823, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  30. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica, 1999. "Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability ? An empirical investigation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2247, The World Bank.
  31. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June.
  32. Barry Eichengreen & Carlos Arteta, 2001. "Banking Crises in Emerging Markets: Presumptions and Evidence," Macroeconomics 0012012, EconWPA.
  33. Alan Morrison & Lucy White, 2004. "Is Deposit Insurance a Good Thing, and If So, Who Should Pay for It?," Economics Series Working Papers 2004-FE-08, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  34. João A. C. Santos, 2000. "Bank capital regulation in contemporary banking theory: a review of the literature," BIS Working Papers 90, Bank for International Settlements.
  35. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1976. "Optimal Financial Crises," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 97-01, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  36. Sebastian Edwards & Igal Magendzo, 2003. "A Currency of One's Own? An Empirical Investigation on Dollarization and Independent Currency Unions," NBER Working Papers 9514, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  37. Alexander Kyei, 1995. "Deposit Protection Arrangements: A Survey," IMF Working Papers 95/134, International Monetary Fund.
  38. Cull, Robert & Senbet, Lemma W. & Sorge, Marco, 2002. "The effect of deposit insurance on financial depth: A cross-country analysis," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 673-694.
  39. Xavier Freixas & Jean Charles Rochet, 1995. "Fair pricing of deposit insurance. Is it possible? Yes. Is it desirable? No," Economics Working Papers 130, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jun 1995.
  40. Christopher Sleet & Bruce D. Smith, 2000. "Deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort functions," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 518-579.
  41. Karels, Gordon V. & McClatchey, Christine A., 1999. "Deposit insurance and risk-taking behavior in the credit union industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 105-134, January.
  42. Pennacchi, George G., 2005. "Risk-based capital standards, deposit insurance, and procyclicality," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 432-465, October.
  43. M. Ayhan Kose & Kenneth Rogoff & Eswar Prasad & Shang-Jin Wei, 2003. "Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries; Some Empirical Evidence," IMF Occasional Papers 220, International Monetary Fund.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lmu:muenec:662. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandra Frank)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.