Deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort functions
We consider issues concerning the design of a banking system "safety net" when both a deposit insurer and a lender of last resort are present. In our model both entities have a role to play. Moreover, issues related to deposit insurance pricing are relatively unimportant in this context, whereas issues related to discount window access and pricing are not. We discuss when and why (or why not) a lender of last resort should lend liberally but charge high rates of interest. And, we raise the possibility that discount window policy may enhance or reduce the scope for multiplicity of equilibria.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): (2000)
Issue (Month): ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.clevelandfed.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Email: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedcpr:y:2000:p:518-579. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lee Faulhaber)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.