IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micro- and macro-prudential concerns

  • Claeys, Sophie
  • Schoors, Koen

Supervisors sometimes have to manage both the micro- and macro- prudential dimensions of bank stability. These may either conflict or complement each other. We analyze prudential supervision by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR). We find evidence of micro-prudential concerns, measured as the rule-based enforcement of bank standards. Macro-prudential concerns are also documented: Banks in concentrated bank markets, large banks, money center banks and large deposit banks are less likely to face license withdrawal. Further, the CBR is reluctant to withdraw licenses when there are “too many banks to fail”. Finally, macro-prudential concerns induce regulatory forbearance, revealing conflicts with micro-prudential objectives.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147-5967(07)00014-5
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Comparative Economics.

Volume (Year): 35 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 630-657

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:35:y:2007:i:3:p:630-657
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622864

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Koen Schoors & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Passive Creditors," Working Papers w0015, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  2. Haizhou Huang & C. A. E. Goodhart, 1999. "A Model of the Lender of Last Resort," IMF Working Papers 99/39, International Monetary Fund.
  3. Freixas, Xavier & Parigi, Bruno & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1999. "Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank," CEPR Discussion Papers 2325, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Acharya, Sankarshan, 1996. "Charter value, minimum bank capital requirement and deposit insurance pricing in equilibrium," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 351-375, March.
  5. Edward J. Kane, 2000. "Incentives for banking megamergers: what motives might regulations infer from event-study evidence?," Proceedings 675, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  6. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 1996. "Interbank lending and systemic risk," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 733-765.
  7. Bruce Champ & Bruce D. Smith & Stephen D. Williamson, 1996. "Currency Elasticity and Banking Panics: Theory and Evidence," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(4), pages 828-64, November.
  8. Charles W. Calomiris & Joseph R. Mason, 2001. "Causes of U.S. bank distress during the depression," Proceedings 714, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  9. Kahn, Charles M. & Santos, Joao A.C., 2005. "Allocating bank regulatory powers: Lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 2107-2136, November.
  10. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1991. "The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1089-1127.
  11. Ioannidou, Vasso P., 2005. "Does monetary policy affect the central bank's role in bank supervision?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 58-85, January.
  12. George J. Mailath & Loretta J. Mester, 1993. "A positive analysis of bank closure," Working Papers 94-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  13. Irina Slinko & Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004. "Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia," Economics Working Papers 0046, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  14. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
  15. Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, 1999. "Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks Be Given to Different Agencies," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 00-11, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  16. Friedrich Heinemann & Martin Schüler, 2004. "A Stiglerian View on Banking Supervision," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 99-130, October.
  17. Neil Wallace, 1990. "A banking model in which partial suspension is best," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall, pages 11-23.
  18. Rafael Repullo, 2000. "Who should act as lender of last resort? an incomplete contracts model," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 580-610.
  19. A. Karas & K. Schoors, 2005. "Heracles or Sisyphus? Finding, cleaning and reconstructing a database of Russian banks," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 05/327, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
  20. Koen Schoors, 2001. "The credit squeeze during Russia's early transition: A bank-based view," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 9(1), pages 205-228, March.
  21. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1993. "Self-Interested Bank Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 206-12, May.
  22. V. V. Chari, 1989. "Banking without deposit insurance or bank panics: lessons from a model of the U.S. national banking system," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Sum, pages 3-19.
  23. Laeven, Luc, 2001. "Insider Lending and Bank Ownership: The Case of Russia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 207-229, June.
  24. Cordella, Tito & Yeyati, Eduardo Levy, 2003. "Bank bailouts: moral hazard vs. value effect," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 300-330, October.
  25. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999. "Is Bank Supervision Central to Central Banking?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(2), pages 629-653.
  26. Haizhou Huang & C. A. E. Goodhart, 2000. "A Simple Model of An International Lender of Last Resort," IMF Working Papers 00/75, International Monetary Fund.
  27. Larry D. Wall & David R. Peterson, 1989. "The effect of Continental Illinois' failure on the financial performance of other banks," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 89-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  28. Postlewaite, Andrew & Vives, Xavier, 1987. "Bank Runs as an Equilibrium Phenomenon," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(3), pages 485-91, June.
  29. Sleet, Christopher & Smith, Bruce D, 2000. "Deposit Insurance and Lender-of-Last-Resort Functions," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 518-75, August.
  30. Leena Mörttinen & Paolo Poloni & Patrick Sandars & Jukka Vesala, 2005. "Analysing banking sector conditions - how to use macro-prudential indicators," Occasional Paper Series 26, European Central Bank.
  31. William Tompson, 2002. "The Present and Future of Banking Reform," Chapters, in: Russian Banking, chapter 3 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  32. Alonso, Irasema, 1996. "On avoiding bank runs," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 73-87, February.
  33. Satoshi Mizobata, 2002. "Bank Sector Restructuring," Chapters, in: Russian Banking, chapter 2 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  34. Pyle, William, 2002. "Overbanked and Credit-Starved: A Paradox of the Transition," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 25-50, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:35:y:2007:i:3:p:630-657. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.