IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Banking without deposit insurance or bank panics: lessons from a model of the U.S. national banking system


  • V. V. Chari


No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • V. V. Chari, 1989. "Banking without deposit insurance or bank panics: lessons from a model of the U.S. national banking system," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Sum, pages 3-19.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmqr:y:1989:i:sum:p:3-19:n:v.13no.3

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Postlewaite, Andrew & Vives, Xavier, 1987. "Bank Runs as an Equilibrium Phenomenon," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(3), pages 485-491, June.
    2. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
    3. Gorton, Gary, 1985. "Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking in the United States," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(02), pages 277-283, June.
    4. Edward J. Kane, 1985. "The Gathering Crisis in Federal Deposit Insurance," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262611856, July.
    5. V.V. Chari & Ravi Jagannathan, 1984. "Banking Panics," Discussion Papers 618, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. John H. Kareken, 1981. "Deregulating commercial banks: the watchword should be caution," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Spr / Sum.
    7. Kareken, John H & Wallace, Neil, 1978. "Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A Partial-Equilibrium Exposition," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(3), pages 413-438, July.
    8. Gorton, Gary & Mullineaux, Donald J, 1987. "The Joint Production of Confidence: Endogenous Regulation and Nineteenth Century Commercial-Bank Clearinghouses," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(4), pages 457-468, November.
    9. Neil Wallace, 1988. "Another attempt to explain an illiquid banking system: the Diamond and Dybvig model with sequential service taken seriously," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall, pages 3-16.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Russell Cooper & Thomas Ross, 1991. "BANK RUNS: Liquidity and Incentives," Papers 0022, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
    2. Claeys, Sophie & Schoors, Koen, 2007. "Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micro- and macro-prudential concerns," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 630-657, September.
    3. Koen Schoors & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Passive Creditors," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 57-86, July.
    4. Temzelides, Theodosios, 1997. "Evolution, coordination, and banking panics," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 163-183, September.
    5. Körnert, Jan, 2006. "Liquidity and solvency problems during the banking crises of the National Banking Era," Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere 05/2006, University of Greifswald, Faculty of Law and Economics.
    6. Robert A. Eisenbeis, 2009. "Multinational Banking and Regulatory Challenges: Lessons from the US Experience with AIG," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 7(2), pages 13-18, 07.
    7. John H. Boyd & Mark Gertler, 1993. "U.S. Commercial Banking: Trends, Cycles, and Policy," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1993, Volume 8, pages 319-377 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Thomas L. Hogan & William J. Luther, 2016. "The Implicit Costs of Government Deposit Insurance," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 31(Summer 20), pages 1-13.
    9. Loewy, Michael B., 1998. "Information-Based Bank Runs in a Monetary Economy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 681-702, October.
    10. Antoine Martin, 2006. "Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(1), pages 197-211, May.
    11. Robert A. Eisenbeis, 2006. "Home country versus cross-border negative externalities in large banking organization failures and how to avoid them," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-18, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    12. François Marini, 1992. "Les fondements micro-économiques du concept de panique bancaire, une introduction," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 43(2), pages 301-326.
    13. Claeys, Sophie & Lanine, Gleb & Schoors, Koen, 2005. "Bank supervision Russian style : rules versus enforcement and tacit objectives," BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2005, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    14. Koeppl, Thorsten V. & MacGee, James C., 2009. "What broad banks do, and markets don't: Cross-subsidization," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 222-236, February.
    15. Carlson, Mark, 2005. "Causes of bank suspensions in the panic of 1893," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 56-80, January.
    16. repec:ces:ifodic:v:7:y:2009:i:2:p:14567113 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 2003. "Financial Fragility, Liquidity and Asset Prices," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 01-37, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    18. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 2004. "Financial Intermediaries and Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(4), pages 1023-1061, July.
    19. Körnert, Jan, 2006. "Analyse der Finanzmärkte der USA in den fünf Bankenkrisen der National Banking-Ära," Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere 01/2006, University of Greifswald, Faculty of Law and Economics.
    20. Arthur J. Rolnick, 1993. "Market disciplines as a regulator of bank risk," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 37, pages 96-110.
    21. Carapella, Francesca, 2015. "Banking panics and deflation in dynamic general equilibrium," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-18, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    22. William C. Hunter & David A. Marshall, 1999. "Thoughts on financial derivatives, systematic risk, and central banking: a review of some recent developments," Working Paper Series WP-99-20, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    23. Hur, Sewon & Kondo, Illenin O., 2016. "A theory of rollover risk, sudden stops, and foreign reserves," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 44-63.
    24. Kornert, Jan, 2003. "The Barings crises of 1890 and 1995: causes, courses, consequences and the danger of domino effects," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 187-209, July.
    25. Carmine DiNoia, 1994. "Structuring Deposit Insurance in Europe: Some Considerations and a Regulatory Game," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 94-31, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedmqr:y:1989:i:sum:p:3-19:n:v.13no.3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jannelle Ruswick). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.