Monitoring, reputation and accountability in issuing banks in mid-nineteenth-century Spain
This paper analyses the determinants of issuing banks' disclosure in the mid-nineteenth century in Spain. Our theses are that the State was the main promoter of accountability because of the public interest in the financial sector, and that banks used disclosure to gain and maintain reputation among their stakeholders in order to facilitate the circulation of their notes. This led to a high level of compliance with regulation, except in the crisis period of 1866-68, and to an increase in voluntary disclosure in bigger banks and in those that received security deposits, which were considered at this time to be a sign of reputation.
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