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Strategic Creditor Passivity, Regulation and Bank Bailouts

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  • Mitchell, Janet

Abstract

This paper analyses two aspects of banking crises: the choices that banks make to passively roll over loans in default versus actively pursuing their claims; and choices by regulators to ‘punish’ passive and insolvent banks versus rescuing them. Banks may choose to roll over loans in order to hide their poor financial conditions or to gamble for resurrection. Regulators can reduce creditor passivity through their ex-ante choice of monitoring capability and their ex-post choice of policy for distressed banks. Yet, if too many banks are discovered to be passive or insolvent, a situation labelled ‘too-many-to-fail’ (TMTF) may arise, whereby it is less costly to rescue than to close large numbers of banks. Banks may implicitly collude through their choice of actions in order to trigger TMTF. A principal result of the analysis is that when the regulator reacts to the threat of banks triggering TMTF, it is by ‘softening’. One form of softening involves lowering the ex-ante monitoring capacity and ‘punishing’ a smaller number of banks ex post. More undetected passivity will thus exist in equilibrium than if TMTF could not be triggered.

Suggested Citation

  • Mitchell, Janet, 1998. "Strategic Creditor Passivity, Regulation and Bank Bailouts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1780, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1780
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mitchell, Janet, 2001. "Bad Debts and the Cleaning of Banks' Balance Sheets: An Application to Transition Economies," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 1-27, January.
    2. Koen Schoors & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Passive Creditors," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 57-86, March.
    3. Jaime Hurtubia & Claudio Sardoni, 2011. "Policy Implications of Using Audits to Detect Bank Insolvencies," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 651, Central Bank of Chile.
    4. Akhmed Akhmedov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004. "Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(4), pages 1301-1338.
    5. Richard Barwell, 2016. "The Social Value of the Financial Sector: Too Big to Fail or Just Too Big?," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(6), pages 839-843, June.
    6. Elisabetta Bertero & Laura Rondi, 2002. "Hardening a Soft Budget Constraint Through 'Upward Devolution' to a Supranational Institution: The Case of Italian State-Owned Firms and the European Union," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2002-16, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    7. John Bonin & Mark E. Schaffer, 1999. "Revisiting Hungary's Bankruptcy Episode," CERT Discussion Papers 9906, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University.
    8. Heinrich, Ralph P. & Buch, Claudia M., 1999. "Handling Banking Crises - The Case of Russia," Kiel Working Papers 920, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    9. Nan-Kuang Chen & Hsiao-Lei Chu, 2003. "Collateral Value and Forbearance Lending," CEP Discussion Papers dp0603, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    10. Galya Taseva, 2019. "Passivity of Creditors among Non-Financial Enterprises in Bulgaria," Economic Studies journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 128-159.
    11. J. Kornai & E. Maskin & G. Roland., 2004. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 12.
    12. Ratnovski, Lev, 2009. "Bank liquidity regulation and the lender of last resort," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 541-558, October.
    13. Hauck, Achim & Neyer, Ulrike & Vieten, Thomas, 2015. "Reestablishing stability and avoiding a credit crunch: Comparing different bad bank schemes," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 116-128.
    14. Jenny Corbett & Janet Mitchell, 2000. "Banking Crises and Bank Rescues: the Role of Reputation," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0676, Econometric Society.
    15. Perotti, Enrico C. & Vesnaver, Luka, 2004. "Enterprise finance and investment in listed Hungarian firms," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 73-87, March.
    16. Frederic Chabellard, 2001. "Dollarization of Liabilities in Non-tradable Goods Sector," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 380, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    17. Miklos Szanyi, 2001. "Life after death : Is it efficient to reallocate the assets of financially distressed firms? Result of an empirical survey," IWE Working Papers 120, Institute for World Economics - Centre for Economic and Regional Studies- Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
    18. Hildebrandt, Antje, 2002. "Too many to fail? : Inter-enterprise arrears in transition economies," BOFIT Discussion Papers 11/2002, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    19. Hauck, Achim & Vollmer, Uwe, 2013. "Emergency liquidity provision to public banks: Rules versus discretion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 193-204.
    20. Maskin, Eric & Xu, Cheng-Gang, 2001. "Soft Budget Constraint Theories: From Centralization to the Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 2715, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banking; Bankruptcy; economies in transition; prudential regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • P5 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems

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