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Does Monetary Policy Affect the Central Bank's Role in Bank Supervision?

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  • Ioannidou, V.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Ioannidou, V., 2002. "Does Monetary Policy Affect the Central Bank's Role in Bank Supervision?," Discussion Paper 2002-54, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:d4561a89-62e5-4350-8810-da5bd8c573e4
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999. "Is Bank Supervision Central to Central Banking?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(2), pages 629-653.
    2. R. Glenn Hubbard, 1995. "Is there a \\"credit channel\\" for monetary policy?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 63-77.
    3. Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 1995. "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 27-48, Fall.
    4. Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, 1997. "Derivatives Activity at Troubled Banks," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 12(2), pages 287-302, October.
    5. Ben S. Bernanke & Ilian Mihov, 1998. "Measuring Monetary Policy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(3), pages 869-902.
    6. Ben S. Bernanke & Cara S. Lown, 1991. "The Credit Crunch," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 22(2), pages 205-248.
    7. Allen N. Berger & Anil K. Kashyap & Joseph M. Scalise, 1995. "The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a Long, Strange Trips It's Been," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 26(2), pages 55-218.
    8. Murillo Campello, 2002. "Internal Capital Markets in Financial Conglomerates: Evidence from Small Bank Responses to Monetary Policy," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(6), pages 2773-2805, December.
    9. Allen N. Berger & Margaret K. Kyle & Joseph M. Scalise, 2001. "Did US Bank Supervisors Get Tougher during the Credit Crunch? Did They Get Easier during the Banking Boom? Did It Matter to Bank Lending?," NBER Chapters, in: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, pages 301-356, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Kashyap, Anil K & Stein, Jeremy C & Wilcox, David W, 1993. "Monetary Policy and Credit Conditions: Evidence from the Composition of External Finance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 78-98, March.
    11. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-560, October.
    12. Katerina Simons, 1995. "Interest rate derivatives and asset-liability management by commercial banks," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Jan, pages 17-28.
    13. Jeremy C. Stein, 1998. "An Adverse-Selection Model of Bank Asset and Liability Management with Implications for the Transmission of Monetary Policy," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(3), pages 466-486, Autumn.
    14. R. Glenn Hubbard, 1995. "Is there a \"credit channel\" for monetary policy?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 63-77.
    15. repec:bla:intfin:v:2:y:1999:i:3:p:361-78 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Peek, Joe & Rosengren, Eric, 1995. "Bank regulation and the credit crunch," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 679-692, June.
    17. Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, 1999. "Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks be Given to Different Agencies?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(3), pages 361-378, November.
    18. Jeremy C. Stein & Anil K. Kashyap, 2000. "What Do a Million Observations on Banks Say about the Transmission of Monetary Policy?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 407-428, June.
    19. Feldman Ron J. & Kim Jan & Miller Preston J. & Schmidt Jason E., 2003. "Are Banking Supervisory Data Useful for Macroeconomic Forecasts?," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-24, February.
    20. Joseph G. Haubrich, 1996. "Combining bank supervision and monetary policy," Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Nov.
    21. anonymous, 2001. "Revisions to staff commentary on Regulation E," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue May, pages 306-306.
    22. Hancock, Diana & Laing, Andrew J. & Wilcox, James A., 1995. "Bank capital shocks: Dynamic effects on securities, loans, and capital," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 661-677, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    central banking; bank supervision; monetary policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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