Forbearance and Prompt Corrective Action
This article investigates whether a bank regulator should terminate problem banks promptly or exercise forbearance. We construct a dynamic model economy in which entrepreneurs pledge collateral, borrow from banks, and invest in long-term projects. We assume that collateral value has aggregate risk over time, that in any period entrepreneurs can abscond with the projects but lose the collateral, and that depositors can withdraw deposits. We show that optimal regulation exhibits forbearance if the ex-ante probability of collapse in collateral value is sufficiently low, but exhibits prompt termination of problem banks if this probability is sufficiently high. Copyright 2007 The Ohio State University.
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|Date of creation:||2005|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA|
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/
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CIRJE-F-225, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
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