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Does deposit insurance improve financial intermediation? Evidence from the Russian experiment

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  • Chernykh, Lucy
  • Cole, Rebel A.

Abstract

This study examines how the introduction of deposit insurance affects depositors and banks, using the deposit-insurance scheme introduced into the Russian banking system as a natural experiment. The fundamental research question is whether the introduction of deposit insurance leads to a more effective banking system as evidenced by increased deposit-taking and decreased reliance upon State-owned banks as custodians of retail deposits. We find that banks entering the new deposit-insurance system increase both their level of retail deposits and their ratios of retail deposits to total assets relative to banks that do not enter the new deposit insurance system. These results hold up in a multivariate panel-data analysis that controls for bank- and time-random effects. The longer a bank has been entered into the deposit insurance system, the greater is its level of deposits and its ratio of deposits to assets. Moreover, this effect is stronger for regional banks and for smaller banks. We also find that implementation of the new deposit-insurance system has the effect of "leveling the playing field" between State-owned banks and privately owned banks. Finally, we find strong evidence of moral hazard following implementation of deposit insurance in the form of increased bank risk-taking. Financial risk and, to a lesser degree, operating risk increase following implementation.

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  • Chernykh, Lucy & Cole, Rebel A., 2011. "Does deposit insurance improve financial intermediation? Evidence from the Russian experiment," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 388-402, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:35:y:2011:i:2:p:388-402
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    Cited by:

    1. Zuzana Fungáčová & Laurent Weill & Mingming Zhou, 2017. "Bank Capital, Liquidity Creation and Deposit Insurance," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 51(1), pages 97-123, February.
    2. Moenninghoff, Sebastian C. & Ongena, Steven & Wieandt, Axel, 2015. "The perennial challenge to counter Too-Big-to-Fail in banking: Empirical evidence from the new international regulation dealing with Global Systemically Important Banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 221-236.
    3. Christian E. Weller & Ghazal Zulfiqar, 2013. "Financial Market Diversity and Macroeconomic Stability," Working Papers wp332, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
    4. Charles W. Calomiris & Matthew Jaremski, 2016. "Deposit Insurance: Theories and Facts," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 8(1), pages 97-120, October.
    5. repec:nea:journl:y:2017i:33:p:44-74 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Anginer, Deniz & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Zhu, Min, 2014. "How does deposit insurance affect bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 312-321.
    7. Simone Auer & Emidio Cocozza & Andrea COlabella, 2016. "The financial systems in Russia and Turkey: recent developments and challenges," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 358, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    8. Mamonov, Mikhail & Vernikov, Andrei, 2015. "Bank ownership and cost efficiency in Russia, revisited," BOFIT Discussion Papers 22/2015, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    9. Hoque, Hafiz & Andriosopoulos, Dimitris & Andriosopoulos, Kostas & Douady, Raphael, 2015. "Bank regulation, risk and return: Evidence from the credit and sovereign debt crises," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 455-474.
    10. Kneer, E.C., 2013. "Essays on the size of the financial aector, financial liberalization and growth," Other publications TiSEM e0f0b672-ce74-40a3-8222-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    11. Solntsev, O. & Mamonov, M. & Pestova, A. & Magomedova, Z., 2011. "Experience in Developing Early Warning System for Financial Crises and the Forecast of Russian Banking Sector Dynamic in 2012," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 12, pages 41-76.
    12. Liu, Liuling & Zhang, Gaiyan & Fang, Yiwei, 2016. "Bank credit default swaps and deposit insurance around the world," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 339-363.
    13. Sokolov, V., 2012. "The Impact of Central Bank Liquidity Infusions on Banks with High Level of Foreign Borrowing during the Crisis," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 51-78.
    14. Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti & Agnese Leonello, 2011. "Deposit insurance and risk taking," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(3), pages 464-478.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank Deposit insurance Financial intermediation Moral hazard Russia State-owned bank;

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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