A Theory of How and Why Central-Bank Culture Supports Predatory Risk-Taking at Megabanks
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- Edward J. Kane, 2016. "A Theory of How and Why Central-Bank Culture Supports Predatory Risk-Taking at Megabanks," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 44(1), pages 51-71, March.
References listed on IDEAS
- Honohan, Patrick & Klingebiel, Daniela, 2003. "The fiscal cost implications of an accommodating approach to banking crises," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(8), pages 1539-1560, August.
- repec:eee:beexfi:v:1:y:2014:i:c:p:1-12 is not listed on IDEAS
- Edward J. Kane, 2006.
"Confronting divergent interests in cross-country regulatory arrangements,"
Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin,
Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 69, pages 1-12., June.
- Edward J. Kane, 2006. "Confronting Divergent Interests in Cross-Country Regulatory Arrangements," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Cross-Border Banking Regulatory Challenges, chapter 18, pages 265-285 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Edward J. Kane, 2005. "Confronting Divergent Interests in Cross-Country Regulatory Arrangements," NBER Working Papers 11865, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dudley, William, 2014. "Opening remarks at the Workshop on Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry," Speech 148, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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- repec:kap:jfsres:v:53:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10693-017-0288-z is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
Keywordsregulatory culture; financial crises; too big to fail; theft by safety net; political economy;
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-05-21 (All new papers)
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