The Skill Profile of Central Bankers and Supervisors
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk & Dasgupta, Paolo, 2001. "The skill profile of central bankers and supervisors," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 25052, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Dirk Schoenmaker & Paolo Dasgupta & Charles Goodhart, 2001. "The Skill Profile of Central Bankers and Supervisors," FMG Discussion Papers dp377, Financial Markets Group.
References listed on IDEAS
- Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999.
"Is Bank Supervision Central to Central Banking?,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(2), pages 629-653.
- Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999. "Is bank supervision central to central banking?," Working Papers 99-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- Carmen M. Reinhart & Graciela L. Kaminsky, 1999.
"The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 473-500, June.
- Reinhart, Carmen & Kaminsky, Graciela, 1999. "The twin crises: The causes of banking and balance of payments problems," MPRA Paper 14081, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Reinhart, Carmen & Kaminsky, Graciela, 2000. "Las crisis gemelas: las causas de los problemas bancarios y de balanza de pagos [The twin crises: Te causes of banking and balance of payments problems]," MPRA Paper 13842, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Carmen M. Reinhart & Graciela L. Kaminsky, 1999.
"The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 473-500, June.
- Graciela L. Kaminsky & Carmen M. Reinhart, 1996. "The twin crises: the causes of banking and balance-of-payments problems," International Finance Discussion Papers 544, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Reinhart, Carmen & Kaminsky, Graciela, 1999. "The twin crises: The causes of banking and balance of payments problems," MPRA Paper 14081, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Cukierman Alex, 1992. "CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY, AND INDEPENDANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE: Compte Rendu par Dominique Cariofillo," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 581-590, December.
- Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
- Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995.
"The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence,"
Papers
9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Eijffinger, S-C-W & de Haan, J, 1996. "The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence," Princeton Studies in International Economics 19, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
- Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-560, October.
- Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, April.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Thomas Jobert & Alexandru Monahov & Anna Tykhonenko, 2014.
"Domestic Credit in Times of Supervision: An Empirical Investigation of European Countries,"
GREDEG Working Papers
2014-30, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
- Thomas Jobert & Alexandru Monahov & Anna Tykhonenko, 2015. "Domestic Credit in Times of Supervision: an Empirical Investigation of European Countries," Working Papers halshs-01295606, HAL.
- Marcelo Rezende, 2011. "How do joint supervisors examine financial institutions? the case of state banks," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2011-43, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Donato Masciandaro, 2012. "Determinants of Financial Supervision Regimes: Markets, Institutions, Politics, Law or Geography?," Chapters, in: Kern Alexander & Rahul Dhumale (ed.), Research Handbook on International Financial Regulation, chapter 14, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Schüler, Martin & Heinemann, Friedrich, 2005. "The Costs of Supervisory Fragmentation in Europe," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-01, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Masciandaro, Donato, 2007. "Divide et impera: Financial supervision unification and central bank fragmentation effect," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 285-315, June.
- Francesc Trillas Jané, 2016. "Behavioral Regulatory Agencies," Working Papers wpdea1606, Department of Applied Economics at Universitat Autonoma of Barcelona.
- Trillas, Francesc, 2013. "The Institutional Architecture of Regulation and Competition: Spains's 2012 Reform," IESE Research Papers D/1067, IESE Business School.
- Donato Masciandaro, 2006. "E Pluribus Unum? Authorities' Design in Financial Supervision: Trends and Determinants," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 73-102, January.
- Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2013. "The Evolution of Financial Supervision: the Continuing Search for the Holy Grail," SUERF 50th Anniversary Volume Chapters, in: Morten Balling & Ernest Gnan (ed.), 50 Years of Money and Finance: Lessons and Challenges, chapter 8, pages 263-318, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
- Daniel Gros & Sam Langfield & Marco Pagano & Dirk Schoenmaker, 2014. "Allocating macro-prudential powers," Report of the Advisory Scientific Committee 5, European Systemic Risk Board.
- Singleton,John, 2010. "Central Banking in the Twentieth Century," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521899093, September.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Dumitriu, Ramona & Stefanescu, Răzvan, 2013. "Decizii strategice ale politicii monetare [Strategic decisions of the Monetary Policy]," MPRA Paper 51242, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Nov 2013.
- Luis Jácome & Francisco Vázquez, 2005.
"Any Link Between Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean,"
Macroeconomics
0508011, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mr. Luis Ignacio Jácome & Mr. Francisco F. Vazquez, 2005. "Any Link Between Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean," IMF Working Papers 2005/075, International Monetary Fund.
- Tamim Bayoumi & Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Karl F Habermeier & Tommaso Mancini Griffoli & Fabian Valencia, 2014. "Monetary Policy in the New Normal," IMF Staff Discussion Notes 14/3, International Monetary Fund.
- Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, 1999.
"Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks be Given to Different Agencies?,"
International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(3), pages 361-378, November.
- Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, 1999. "Should banking supervision and monetary policy tasks be given to different agencies?," Economics Working Papers 411, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, 1999. "Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks Be Given to Different Agencies," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 00-11, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Athanassiou, Phoebus, 2011. "Financial sector supervisors' accountability: a european perspective," Legal Working Paper Series 12, European Central Bank.
- Crowe, Christopher & Meade, Ellen E., 2008.
"Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 763-777, December.
- Christopher Crowe & Ellen E. Meade, 2007. "Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution and Effectiveness," Working Papers 2007-20, American University, Department of Economics.
- Mr. Christopher W. Crowe & Ellen E. Meade, 2008. "Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution and Effectiveness," IMF Working Papers 2008/119, International Monetary Fund.
- MARTÍNEZ-RUIZ, Elena & NOGUES-MARCO, Pilar, 2018. "The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Stability During the Gold Standard. Spain 1874—1914," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-75, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
- Stephanos Papadamou & Moïse Sidiropoulos & Eleftherios Spyromitros, 2017. "Is There a Role for Central Bank Independence on Public Debt Dynamics?," Journal of Applied Finance & Banking, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 7(1), pages 1-6.
- Cukierman, Alex & Miller, Geoffrey P. & Neyapti, Bilin, 2002.
"Central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in transition economies--an international perspective,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 237-264, March.
- Cukierman, A. & Miller, G.P. & Neyapti, B., 2000. "Central Bank Reform, Liberalization and Inflation in Transition Economies : An International Perspective," Discussion Paper 2000-106, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Cukierman, A. & Miller, G.P. & Neyapti, B., 2000. "Central Bank Reform, Liberalization and Inflation in Transition Economies : An International Perspective," Other publications TiSEM cdb9e743-09ef-4f01-82f3-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Cukierman, A. & Miller, G.P. & Neyapti, B., 2000. "Central Bank Rerform, Liberalization and Inflation in Transition Economies - an International Perspective," Papers 00-19, Tel Aviv.
- Cukierman, A. & Miller, G.P. & Neyapti, B., 2000. "Central Bank Rerform, Liberalization and Inflation in Transition Economies - an International Perspective," Papers 2000-19, Tel Aviv.
- Cukierman, Alex & Miller, Geoffrey & Neyapti, Bilin, 2001. "Central Bank Reform, Liberalization and Inflation in Transition Economies - An International Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 2808, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- CHOI, Jay Pil & FURUSAWA, Taiji, 2018.
"Transfer Pricing and the Arm's Length Principle under Imperfect Competition,"
Discussion paper series
HIAS-E-73, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
- Jay Pil Choi & Taiji Furusawa & Jota Ishikawa, 2018. "Transfer Pricing and the Arm's Length Principle under Imperfect Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 7303, CESifo.
- Da Silva, Sergio & Nunes, Mauricio, 2007. "Latin American foreign exchange intervention - Updated," MPRA Paper 1982, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019.
"Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy And Psychology," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19105, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Danilo José Rodrigues Passos & Pedro Garcia Duarte, 2014. "Reavaliando A Relação Entre Independência Do Banco Central E Custos De Desinflação: Uma Análise De Viés De Seleção," Anais do XLI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 41st Brazilian Economics Meeting] 040, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
- Jorge Ponce & Magdalena Tubio, 2010. "Estabilidad financiera: conceptos básicos," Documentos de trabajo 2010004, Banco Central del Uruguay.
- Martha A. Starr, 2006. "One World, One Currency: Exploring The Issues," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 24(4), pages 618-633, October.
- Lucía Cuadro Sáez & Sonsoles Gallego Herrero & Alicia García Herrero, 2003. "Why Do Countries Develop More Financially Than Others? The Role Of The Central Bank And Banking Supervision," Finance 0304006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Shimpalee, Pattama L. & Breuer, Janice Boucher, 2006. "Currency crises and institutions," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 125-145, February.
- Joon-Ho Hahm & Frederic S. Mishkin, 2000. "Causes of the Korean Financial Crisis: Lessons for Policy," NBER Working Papers 7483, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Diana N. Weymark, 2005. "Inflation, Government Transfers, and Optimal Central Bank Independence," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0502, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Jörg Bibow, 2004.
"Reflections on the current fashion for central bank independence,"
Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 28(4), pages 549-576, July.
- Jorg Bibow, "undated". "Reflections on the Current Fashion for Central Bank Independence," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_334, Levy Economics Institute.
- Jörg Bibow, 2001. "Reflections on the Current Fashion For Central Bank Independence," Macroeconomics 0108004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- O40 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:6:y:2002:i:3:p:397-427.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/eufaaea.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.