The Skill Profile of Central Bankers and Supervisors
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- Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk & Dasgupta, Paolo, 2001. "The skill profile of central bankers and supervisors," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 25052, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Dirk Schoenmaker & Paolo Dasgupta & Charles Goodhart, 2001. "The Skill Profile of Central Bankers and Supervisors," FMG Discussion Papers dp377, Financial Markets Group.
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Cited by:
- Marcelo Rezende, 2011. "How do joint supervisors examine financial institutions? the case of state banks," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2011-43, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Thomas Jobert & Alexandru Monahov & Anna Tykhonenko, 2014.
"Domestic Credit in Times of Supervision: An Empirical Investigation of European Countries,"
GREDEG Working Papers
2014-30, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
- Thomas Jobert & Alexandru Monahov & Anna Tykhonenko, 2015. "Domestic Credit in Times of Supervision: an Empirical Investigation of European Countries," Working Papers halshs-01295606, HAL.
- Donato Masciandaro, 2012. "Determinants of Financial Supervision Regimes: Markets, Institutions, Politics, Law or Geography?," Chapters, in: Kern Alexander & Rahul Dhumale (ed.), Research Handbook on International Financial Regulation, chapter 14, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Schüler, Martin & Heinemann, Friedrich, 2005. "The Costs of Supervisory Fragmentation in Europe," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-01, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Masciandaro, Donato, 2007. "Divide et impera: Financial supervision unification and central bank fragmentation effect," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 285-315, June.
- Francesc Trillas Jané, 2016. "Behavioral Regulatory Agencies," Working Papers wpdea1606, Department of Applied Economics at Universitat Autonoma of Barcelona.
- Trillas, Francesc, 2013. "The Institutional Architecture of Regulation and Competition: Spains's 2012 Reform," IESE Research Papers D/1067, IESE Business School.
- Donato Masciandaro, 2006. "E Pluribus Unum? Authorities' Design in Financial Supervision: Trends and Determinants," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 73-102, January.
- Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2013. "The Evolution of Financial Supervision: the Continuing Search for the Holy Grail," SUERF 50th Anniversary Volume Chapters, in: Morten Balling & Ernest Gnan (ed.), 50 Years of Money and Finance: Lessons and Challenges, chapter 8, pages 263-318, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
- Daniel Gros & Sam Langfield & Marco Pagano & Dirk Schoenmaker, 2014. "Allocating macro-prudential powers," Report of the Advisory Scientific Committee 5, European Systemic Risk Board.
- Singleton,John, 2010. "Central Banking in the Twentieth Century," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521899093, January.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- O40 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
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