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Divide et impera: Financial supervision unification and central bank fragmentation effect

  • Masciandaro, Donato

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V97-4JJG9WX-2/2/cf324838434a79227ebd09926796afcf
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 23 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 285-315

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:23:y:2007:i:2:p:285-315
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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  1. Dirk Schoenmaker, 1992. "Institutional Separation between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies," FMG Special Papers sp52, Financial Markets Group.
  2. Sander Oosterloo & Jakob de Haan, 2003. "A Survey of Institutional Frameworks for Financial Stability," DNB Occasional Studies 104, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  3. Perotti, Enrico C & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 2003. "The Political Economy of Bank and Equity Dominance," CEPR Discussion Papers 3914, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1768, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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    • La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1998. "Law and Finance," Scholarly Articles 3451310, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  5. Potts, Glenn T & Luckett, Dudley G, 1978. "Policy Objectives of the Federal Reserve System," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 92(3), pages 525-34, August.
  6. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Luc Laeven & Ross Levine, 2004. "Regulations, market structure, institutions, and the cost of financial intermediation," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 593-626.
  7. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999. "Is Bank Supervision Central To Central Banking?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(2), pages 629-653, May.
  8. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, 1989. "Does Monetary Policy Matter? A New Test in the Spirit of Friedman and Schwartz," NBER Working Papers 2966, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Charles M. Kahn & João A.C. Santos, 2001. "Allocating bank regulatory powers: lender of last resort, deposit insurance, and supervision," Proceedings 717, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  10. Joseph G. Haubrich, 1996. "Combining bank supervision and monetary policy," Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Nov.
  11. Repullo, R., 1999. "Who Should Act as Lender of Last Resort? An Incomplete Contracts Model," Papers 9913, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
  12. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Restructuring Financial Regulation in the European Monetary Union," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 57-82, February.
  13. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2003. "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2009, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  14. Charles Goodhart & Dirk Schoenmaker & Paolo Dasgupta, 2001. "The skill profile of central bankers and supervisors," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 25052, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  15. La Porta, Rafael & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. " Legal Determinants of External Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1131-50, July.
  16. Marco Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin, 2005. "The Political Economy of Corporate Governance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1005-1030, September.
  17. Schüler, Martin, 2003. "How Do Banking Supervisors Deal with Europe-wide Systemic Risk?," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-03, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  18. Wallace, Myles S. & Warner, John T., 1984. "Fed policy and presidential elections," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 79-88.
  19. Alicia García Herrero & Pedro del Río López, 2003. "Implications of the design of monetary policy for financial stability," Macroeconomics 0304008, EconWPA.
  20. de Luna Martinez, Jose & Rose, Thomas A., 2003. "International survey of integrated financial sector supervision," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3096, The World Bank.
  21. Carletti, Elena & Hartmann, Philipp, 2002. "Competition and stability: what's special about banking?," Working Paper Series 0146, European Central Bank.
  22. Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Levine, Ross, 1999. "A new database on financial development and structure," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2146, The World Bank.
  23. Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, 1999. "Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks Be Given to Different Agencies," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 00-11, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  24. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-60, October.
  25. Michael Taylor & Marc Quintyn, 2002. "Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability," IMF Working Papers 02/46, International Monetary Fund.
  26. Katharina Pistor, 2000. "Patterns of legal change: shareholder and creditor rights in transition economies," Working Papers 49, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Office of the Chief Economist.
  27. Clive Briault, 2002. "Revisiting the Rationale for a Single National Financial Services Regulator," FMG Special Papers sp135, Financial Markets Group.
  28. Hakes, David R., 1988. "October 1979: Did the Federal Reserve change policy objectives?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 159-167, May.
  29. Hakes, David R, 1990. "The Objectives and Priorities of Monetary Policy under Different Federal Reserve Chairmen," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 22(3), pages 327-37, August.
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