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How Do Banking Supervisors Deal with Europe-wide Systemic Risk?


  • Schüler, Martin


The systemic risk potential in the European banking market has increased. Hence, the following questions emerge: Is there a need for a truly European supervisory framework? And, how should a potential European supervisor be organised? This paper evaluates the existing supervisory framework as well as the recent proposal by the Economic and Financial Committee of the EU with respect to the increased Europe-wide systemic risk. We argue that cooperation between national supervisors even in the new framework will not be sufficient for safeguarding financial stability. As a consequence, we argue in favour of a European observatory of systemic risk.

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  • Schüler, Martin, 2003. "How Do Banking Supervisors Deal with Europe-wide Systemic Risk?," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-03, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:899

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    Cited by:

    1. Edward J. Kane, 2008. "Regulation and Supervision: An Ethical Perspective," NBER Working Papers 13895, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Edward Kane, 2006. "Can the European Community Afford to Neglect the Need for More Accountable Safety-Net Management?," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 34(2), pages 127-144, June.
    3. Donato Masciandaro, 2012. "Determinants of Financial Supervision Regimes: Markets, Institutions, Politics, Law or Geography?," Chapters,in: Research Handbook on International Financial Regulation, chapter 14 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Robert A. Eisenbeis, 2006. "Home country versus cross-border negative externalities in large banking organization failures and how to avoid them," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-18, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    5. Kane, Edward J., 2006. "Inadequacy of nation-based and VaR-based safety nets in the European Union," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 375-387, December.
    6. Schüler, Martin & Schröder, Michael, 2003. "Systemic Risk in European Banking: Evidence from Bivariate GARCH Models," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-11, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    7. Masciandaro, Donato, 2007. "Divide et impera: Financial supervision unification and central bank fragmentation effect," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 285-315, June.
    8. Schüler, Martin, 2003. "Incentive Problems in Banking Supervision: The European Case," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-62, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.

    More about this item


    banking supervision and regulation; European Union;

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation


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