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Can the European Community Afford to Neglect the Need for More Accountable Safety-Net Management?

  • Edward J. Kane

As financial institutions and markets transact more and more cross-border business, gaps and flaws in national safety nets become more consequential. Because citizens of host (home) countries may be made to pay for mistakes made in the home (host) country, Basel's lead-regulator paradigm violates the principle of democratic accountability. Because important differences exist in policymaking authority, instruments, and goals, banking supervisors need to improve their ability to monitor and mitigate the consequences of defects in one another's performance. A straightforward way to enhance both capacities would be to establish opportunities for public trading in debt obligations and reinsurance derivatives issued by country-level deposit-insurance entities.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 11860.

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Date of creation: Dec 2005
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Publication status: published as Kane, Edward J. "Can the European Community Afford to Neglect the Need for More Accountable Safety-Net Management?" Atlantic Economic Journal 34, 127-144. 2006.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11860
Note: CF
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  1. Mario Draghi & Francesco Giavazzi & Robert C. Merton, 2003. "Transparency, Risk Management and International Financial Fragility," NBER Working Papers 9806, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. William Goetzmann & Lingfeng Li & K. Rouwenhorst, 2001. "Long-Term Global Market Correlations," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm237, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Jan 2008.
  3. Calomiris, Charles W., 1990. "Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(02), pages 283-295, June.
  4. Michael M. Hutchison, . "European Banking Distress and EMU: Institutional and Macroeconomic Risks," EPRU Working Paper Series 00-04, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  5. Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Edward J. Kane, 2002. "Deposit Insurance Around the Globe: Where Does It Work?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 175-195, Spring.
  6. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Kane, Edward J. & Laeven, Luc, 2006. "Determinants of deposit-insurance adoption and design," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3849, The World Bank.
  7. Schüler, Martin, 2003. "How Do Banking Supervisors Deal with Europe-wide Systemic Risk?," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-03, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  8. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Restructuring Financial Regulation in the European Monetary Union," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 57-82, February.
  9. Kane, Edward J., 2003. "What kind of multinational deposit-insurance arrangements might best enhance world welfare?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 413-428, September.
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