Regulation and Supervision: An Ethical Perspective
This essay shows that government credit-allocation schemes generate incentive conflicts that undermine the quality of bank supervision and eventually produce banking crisis. For political reasons, most countries establish a regulatory culture that embraces three economically contradictory elements: politically directed subsidies to selected bank borrowers; subsidized provision of explicit or implicit repayment guarantees for the creditors of banks that participate in the credit-allocation scheme; and defective government monitoring and control of the subsidies to leveraged risk-taking that the other two elements produce. In 2007-2008, technological change and regulatory competition simultaneously encouraged incentive-conflicted supervisors to outsource much of their due discipline to credit-rating firms and encouraged banks to securitize their loans in ways that pushed credit risks on poorly underwritten loans into corners of the universe where supervisors and credit-ratings firms would not see them.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2008|
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|Publication status:||published as Regulation and Supervision: An Ethical Perspective Edward J. Kane The Oxford Handbook of Banking Print Publication Date: Jan 2012 Subject: Economics and Finance, Financial Economics, Public Economics and Policy Online Publication Date: Sep 2012 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199640935.013.0012|
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- Edward J. Kane, 1998.
"Capital Movements, Asset Values, and Banking Policy in Globalized Markets,"
NBER Working Papers
6633, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Edward J. Kane, 1998. "Capital movements, asset values, and banking policy in globalized markets," Proceedings 606, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Honohan, Patrick & Klingebiel, Daniela, 2003. "The fiscal cost implications of an accommodating approach to banking crises," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(8), pages 1539-1560, August.
- Schüler, Martin, 2003. "How Do Banking Supervisors Deal with Europe-wide Systemic Risk?," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-03, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
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