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Financial Architecture

  • Lars Calmfors
  • Giancarlo Corsetti
  • John Flemming
  • Seppo Honkapohja
  • John Kay
  • Willi Leibfritz
  • Gilles Saint-Paul
  • Hans-Werner Sinn
  • Xavier Vives

This chapter analyses the current financial architecture of the euro area, questioning whether the current institutional arrangements are adequate to reduce the risk of financial crises, and deal with them if they occur.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/ZS/ZS-EEAG_Report/zs-eeag-2003/forumspecial_chap4_2003.pdf
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Article provided by CESifo Group Munich in its journal EEAG Report on the European Economy.

Volume (Year): (2003)
Issue (Month): (05)
Pages: 98-117

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Handle: RePEc:ces:eeagre:v::y:2003:i::p:98-117
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  1. Jean-Charles Rochet & Xavier Vives, 2002. "Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All?," FMG Discussion Papers dp408, Financial Markets Group.
  2. Marvin Goodfriend & Robert G. King, 1988. "Financial deregulation, monetary policy, and central banking," Working Paper 88-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  3. Postlewaite, Andrew & Vives, Xavier, 1987. "Bank Runs as an Equilibrium Phenomenon," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(3), pages 485-91, June.
  4. Di Noia, Carmine & Di Giorgio, Giorgio, 1999. "Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks Be Given to Different Agencies?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(3), pages 361-78, November.
  5. Demirguc-Kent, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica, 1998. "Financial liberalization and financial fragility," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1917, The World Bank.
  6. Matutes, Carmen & Vives, Xavier, 2000. "Imperfect competition, risk taking, and regulation in banking," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-34, January.
  7. Jacklin, Charles J & Bhattacharya, Sudipto, 1988. "Distinguishing Panics and Information-Based Bank Runs: Welfare and Policy Implications," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 568-92, June.
  8. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-60, October.
  9. Cornelia Holthausen & Thomas Rønde, 2003. "Cooperation in International Banking Supervision," CIE Discussion Papers 2004-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  10. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Restructuring Financial Regulation in the European Monetary Union," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 57-82, February.
  11. Allen N. Berger & Robert De Young & Gregory F. Udell, 2001. "Efficiency Barriers to the Consolidation of the European Financial Services Industry," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 7(1), pages 117-130.
  12. Prati, A. & Schinasi, G.J., 1999. "Financial Stability in European Economic and Monetary Union," Princeton Studies in International Economics 86, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
  13. Cordella, Tito & Levy Yeyati, Eduardo, 1998. "Financial Opening, Deposit Insurance and Risk in a Model of Banking Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 1939, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Mayes, David & Vesala, Jukka, 1998. "On the Problems of Home Country Control," Research Discussion Papers 20/1998, Bank of Finland.
  15. The Giovannini Group, 2002. "Cross-border clearing and settlement arrangements in the European Union," European Economy - Economic Papers 163, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
  16. Working Group of the Economic and Financial Committee, 2000. "Report on financial stability," European Economy - Economic Papers 143, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
  17. Vives, Xavier, 2002. "External discipline and financial stability," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 821-828, May.
  18. Honohan, Patrick & Klingebiel, Daniela, 2000. "Controlling the fiscal costs of banking crises," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2441, The World Bank.
  19. André Sapir & Daniel Begg & Alasdair Smith & Charles Wyplosz & Carl Hamilton & L. Alan Winters & Francesco Giavazzi & Victor Norman & Jean-Pierre Danthine & Damien Neven, 1990. "Monitoring European integration: the impact of Eastern Europe :a CEPR annual report," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/8224, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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