The Objectives and Priorities of Monetary Policy under Different Federal Reserve Chairmen
This paper utilizes a monetary policy reaction function that relates policy intentions to forecasts of policy objectives. Estimates of this reaction function over the post-Accord period suggest that the Burns period was unique. While the Martin and Volcker periods were extremely similar, the Burns period was structurally distinct from both the Martin and Volcker periods. Further, model specifications that allow for an independent influence on monetary policy from different presidential administrations also imply that there are significant differences in monetary policy under different Fed chairmen. Copyright 1990 by Ohio State University Press.
Volume (Year): 22 (1990)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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