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Level Playing Fields in International Financial Regulation

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  • ALAN D. MORRISON
  • LUCY WHITE

Abstract

We analyze the desirability of level playing fields in international financial regulation. In general, level playing fields impose the standards of the weakest regulator upon the best-regulated economies. However, they may be desirable when capital is mobile because they counter a "cherry-picking" effect that lowers the size and efficiency of banks in weaker economies. Hence, while a "laissez faire" policy favors the better-regulated economy, level playing fields are good for weaker regulators. We show that multinational banking mitigates the cherry-picking effect, and reduces the damage that a level playing field causes in the better-regulated economy. Copyright (c) 2009 The American Finance Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Alan D. Morrison & Lucy White, 2009. "Level Playing Fields in International Financial Regulation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(3), pages 1099-1142, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:64:y:2009:i:3:p:1099-1142
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    Cited by:

    1. Thierry Tressel & Thierry Verdier, 2014. "Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision," IMF Working Papers 14/90, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Morrison, Alan D. & White, Lucy, 2010. "Reputational contagion and optimal regulatory forbearance," Working Paper Series 1196, European Central Bank.
    3. Buck, Florian & Schliephake, Eva, 2013. "The regulator’s trade-off: Bank supervision vs. minimum capital," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4584-4598.
    4. Ongena, Steven & Popov, Alexander & Udell, Gregory F., 2013. "“When the cat's away the mice will play”: Does regulation at home affect bank risk-taking abroad?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 727-750.
    5. Pierre C. Boyer & Hubert Kempf, 2016. "Regulatory arbitrage and the efficiency of banking regulation," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1618, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    6. Niepmann, Friederike, 2015. "Banking across borders," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 244-265.
    7. Haritchabalet, Carole & Lepetit, Laetitia & Spinassou, Kévin & Strobel, Frank, 2017. "Bank capital regulation: Are local or central regulators better?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 103-114.
    8. Engel, Charles, 2016. "International coordination of central bank policy," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 13-24.
    9. Morrison, Alan D. & White, Lucy, 2013. "Reputational contagion and optimal regulatory forbearance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 642-658.
    10. Andreas Haufler & Ulf Maier, 2016. "Regulatory Competition in Capital Standards with Selection Effects among Banks," CESifo Working Paper Series 5839, CESifo Group Munich.
    11. Costas N. Kanellopoulos, 2012. "Employment and worker flows during the financial crisis," Economic Bulletin, Bank of Greece, issue 36, pages 31-41, April.
    12. repec:bla:jrinsu:v:84:y:2017:i:4:p:1231-1267 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Schenkel, Andreas, 2015. "Bankenregulierung und Bürokratiekosten: Ein Problemaufriss," Arbeitspapiere 152, University of Münster, Institute for Cooperatives.
    14. David VanHoose, 2016. "Should financial regulators engage in international policy coordination?," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 319-338, April.
    15. Kara, Gazi Ishak, 2016. "Systemic risk, international regulation, and the limits of coordination," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 192-222.
    16. Florian Buck & Eva Schliephake, 2012. "The Regulator's Trade-off: Bank Supervision vs. Minimum Capital," CESifo Working Paper Series 3923, CESifo Group Munich.
    17. Pierre C. Boyer & Hubert Kempf, 2017. "Regulatory arbitrage and the e ciency of banking regulation," Working Papers 2017-06, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    18. Buck, Florian & Schliephake, Eva, 2012. "Political Economy of Banking Regulation," Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62018, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    19. Michael, Bryane & Falzon, Joseph & Shamdasani, Ajay, 2015. "A Theory of Financial Services Competition, Compliance and Regulation," EconStor Preprints 107400, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.
    20. Maier, Ulf, 2017. "Regulatory Competition In Capital Standards with Selection Effects among Banks," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 7, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    21. Buch, Claudia M. & Krause, Thomas & Tonzer, Lena, 2017. "Drivers of systemic risk: Do national and European perspectives differ?," Discussion Papers 09/2017, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    22. Frame, W. Scott & Mihov, Atanas & Sanz, Leandro, 2017. "Foreign Investment, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Risk of U.S. Banking Organizations," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2017-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    23. Marcelo Rezende, 2011. "How Do Joint Supervisors Examine Financial Institutions? The Case of Banks," Chapters,in: Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 18 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    24. Morrison, Alan & White, Lucy, 2013. "Reputational Contagion and Optimal Regulatory Forbearance," CEPR Discussion Papers 9508, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    25. Elena Carletti & Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Robert Marquez, 2016. "Supervisory Incentives in a Banking Union," IMF Working Papers 16/186, International Monetary Fund.

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