Den Bock zum Gärtner machen? – Eine ordnungspolitische Hinterfragung der Bankenunion / ECB as single supervisory authority: Setting the fox to watch the geese?

ECB pursues its policy of accomplishing its monetary powers by fiscal policy. In that context ECB has pumped liquidity into the European banking system and has watered down eligibility requirements for collaterals. Despite that risky policy ECB aims at becoming through the banking union the central supervisor for microprudential controlling in the euro zone. ECB is now expected, after the identification of failing banks, to request the single resolution mechanism for their liquidation. Thus the Union organ, which is supposed to pay tribute to the priority objective of price stability, is enabled to accomplish a mission which the bank cannot solve without putting its independence at risk. The central refinancing instance which has accepted for the sake of banks high risks and historically unique interest conditions, is now supposed to catch up with the consequences of its liquidity and collateral policy. Nevertheless ECB refuses to stop the privileged refinancing of the state by banks. If ever in case of insufficient funds of the Single Resolution fund ESM has to recapitalise banks that would trigger off a process of divorce between management and liability in the banking industry. Hopefully then at last the very specific German business model of saving banks and cooperatives would understand that they have financially contributed to a fund without ever using its financial support.