The Single Supervisory Mechanism - Panacea or Quack Banking Regulation? Preliminary assessment of the evolving regime for the prudential supervision of banks with ECB involvement
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- Tröger, Tobias H., 2014. "The single supervisory mechanism - Panacea of quack banking regulation? Preliminary assessment of the evolving regime for the prudential supervision of banks with ECB involvement," SAFE Working Paper Series 27 [rev.], Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Goethe University Frankfurt.
- Tröger, Tobias H., 2013. "The single supervisory mechanism - Panacea of quack banking regulation? Preliminary assessment of the evolving regime for the prudential supervision of banks with ECB involvement," SAFE Working Paper Series 27, Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Goethe University Frankfurt.
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More about this item
Keywordsprudential supervision; banking union; regulatory capture; political economy of bureaucracy; Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM); European Central Bank (ECB); European Banking Authority (EBA);
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-08-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2014-08-28 (Central Banking)
- NEP-CDM-2014-08-28 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-LAW-2014-08-28 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MON-2014-08-28 (Monetary Economics)
- NEP-REG-2014-08-28 (Regulation)
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