Politics and the Theory of Organization
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- J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, 2001. "When are Judges and Bureaucrats Left Independent? Theory and History from Imperial Japan, Postwar Japan, and the United States," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-126, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Tröger, Tobias, 2013.
"The Single Supervisory Mechanism - Panacea or Quack Banking Regulation? Preliminary assessment of the evolving regime for the prudential supervision of banks with ECB involvement,"
IMFS Working Paper Series
73, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
- Tröger, Tobias H., 2014. "The single supervisory mechanism - Panacea of quack banking regulation? Preliminary assessment of the evolving regime for the prudential supervision of banks with ECB involvement," SAFE Working Paper Series 27 [rev.], Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
- Tröger, Tobias H., 2013. "The single supervisory mechanism - Panacea of quack banking regulation? Preliminary assessment of the evolving regime for the prudential supervision of banks with ECB involvement," SAFE Working Paper Series 27, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
- Blom, Tannelie and Valentina Carraro, 2014. "An information processing approach to public organizations: The case of the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 18, February.
- Menard, Claude, 1995. "Markets as institutions versus organizations as markets? Disentangling some fundamental concepts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 161-182, October.
- Glazer, A. & Kanniainen, V., 2000. "Term Length and the Quality of Appointment," Papers 00-04, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
- Jeremy Jackson, 2013. "Tax earmarking, party politics and gubernatorial veto: theory and evidence from US states," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 1-18, April.
- Theurl Theresia & Matschke Andrea, 2006. "Internationale Wettbewerbspolitik im institutionellen Wandel / International Competition Policy and Institutional Change," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 57(1), pages 137-163, January.
- Aggey Semenov, 2008.
"Bargaining in the appointment process, constrained delegation and the political weight of the Senate,"
Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 165-180, July.
- Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Bargaining in the Appointment Process, Constrained Delegation and the Political Weight of the Senate," MPRA Paper 6988, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ashok Chakravarti, 2012. "Institutions, Economic Performance and the Visible Hand," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14751, April.
- P. Hägg, 1997. "Theories on the Economics of Regulation: A Survey of the Literature from a European Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 337-370, December.
- Marian Döhler, 2017. "The Bias of Structures: How Multidivisional Organizations Work in the Public Sector," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 83-100, March.
- Schmidt, Torsten, 2001. "Finanzreformen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Analyse der Veränderungen der Finanzverfassung von 1949 bis 1989," RWI Schriften, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, volume 67, number 67.
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