Bargaining in the appointment process, constrained delegation and the political weight of the Senate
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- Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Bargaining in the Appointment Process, Constrained Delegation and the Political Weight of the Senate," MPRA Paper 6988, University Library of Munich, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2005. "Veto-Based Delegation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 129, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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- Krähmer, Daniel & Kováč, Eugen, 2016.
"Optimal sequential delegation,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 849-888.
- Kovác, Eugen & Krähmer, Daniel, 2013. "Optimal Sequential Delegation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 427, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
More about this item
KeywordsAppointments; Bargaining; Veto-based delegation; Constrained delegation; D82; H11;
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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