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Information Aggregation and Countervailing Biases in Organizations

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  • Saori CHIBA
  • Kaiwen LEONG

Abstract

A decision maker relies on an agent for decision-relevant information. We consider two dimensions of biases—one over projects (project bias) often assumed in cheap talk models à la Crawford and Sobel (1982) and the other over the outside option (pandering bias) scrutinized in Che, Dessein and Kartik (2013). The two biases counteract each other. This effect is more significant as payoffs to different projects are more highly negatively correlated. As a result, a larger project bias can facilitate cheap talk communications and benefit the players. Due to this correlation-driven countervailing biases, the comparison between vetobased delegation and non-delegation is not trivial.

Suggested Citation

  • Saori CHIBA & Kaiwen LEONG, 2018. "Information Aggregation and Countervailing Biases in Organizations," Discussion papers e-18-007, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
  • Handle: RePEc:kue:epaper:e-18-007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bias; Cheap Talk; Correlation; Outside Option.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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