Employee Initiative and Managerial Control
I analyze the impact of managerial involvement and the allocation of authority on employee initiative in a setting where both a manager and an employee can originate new ideas for implementation. I show that employee initiative is maximized through the combination of formal authority and limited but positive levels of involvement by the manager, a result which thus qualifies the motivational advantages of both formal delegation and a hands-off management strategy. This result arises through an indirect monitoring role played by managerial involvement that has been absent in previous frameworks, and the implications of which for the optimal organizational arrangement are further analyzed. (JEL D23, M12, M54)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 4 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://www.aeaweb.org/aej-micro|
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: https://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
- Baker, George & Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1999. "Informal Authority in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 56-73, April.
- Helmut Bester & Daniel Krähmer, 2008.
"Delegation and incentives,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, vol. 39(3), pages 664-682.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2006. "Delegation and incentives," Discussion Papers 2007/1, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2007. "Delegation and Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 6042, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.