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Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organisation of Firms

  • Phillipe Aghion
  • Nicholas Bloom
  • John Van Reenen

We survey the theoretical and empirical literature on decentralization within firms. We first discuss how the concept of incomplete contracts shapes our views about the organization of decision-making within firms. We then overview the empirical evidence on the determinants of decentralization and on the effects of decentralization on firm performance. A number of factors highlighted in the theory are shown to be important in accounting for delegation, such as heterogeneity and congruence of preferences as proxied by trust. Empirically, competition, human capital and IT also appear to foster decentralization. There are substantial gaps between theoretical and empirical work and we suggest avenues for future research in bridging this gap.

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File URL: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/occasional/op036.pdf
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Paper provided by Centre for Economic Performance, LSE in its series CEP Occasional Papers with number 36.

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Date of creation: Mar 2013
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Handle: RePEc:cep:cepops:36
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/series.asp?prog=CEPOP

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  1. Van Reenen, John & Caroli, Eve, 2001. "Skill-Biased Organizational Change? Evidence from a panel of British and French establishments," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/10093, Paris Dauphine University.
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  17. V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010. "Strategic Information Transmission," Levine's Working Paper Archive 544, David K. Levine.
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