Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment
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- Oriana Bandiera & Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, 2007. "Incentives for Managers and Inequality among Workers: Evidence from a Firm-Level Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(2), pages 729-773.
- Bandiera, Oriana & Barankay, Iwan & Rasul, Imran, 2006. "Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 5649, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Orana Bandiera & Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, 2006. "Incentives for managers and inequality among workers: Evidence from a firm level experiment," Natural Field Experiments 00213, The Field Experiments Website.
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More about this item
Keywords
earnings inequality; selection; targeting; managerial incentives;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EFF-2006-04-22 (Efficiency and Productivity)
- NEP-LAB-2006-04-22 (Labour Economics)
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