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Field Experiments with Firms

Author

Listed:
  • Oriana Bandiera
  • Iwan Baranky
  • Imran Rasul

Abstract

We discuss how the use of field experiments sheds light on long standing research questions relating to firm behavior. We present insights from two classes of experiments: within and across firms, and draw common lessons from both sets. Field experiments within firms generally aim to shed light on the nature of agency problems. Along these lines, we discuss how field experiments have provided new insights on shirking behavior, and the provision of monetary and non-monetary incentives. Field experiments across firms generally aim to uncover firms' binding constraints by exogenously varying the availability of key inputs such as labor, physical capital, and managerial capital. We conclude by discussing some of the practical issues researchers face when designing experiments and by highlighting areas for further research.

Suggested Citation

  • Oriana Bandiera & Iwan Baranky & Imran Rasul, 2011. "Field Experiments with Firms," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 028, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  • Handle: RePEc:cep:stieop:028
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    field experiments; firms; organizations;

    JEL classification:

    • C5 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling
    • M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics

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