A theory of hierarchies based on limited managerial attention
Our purpose in this paper is to investigate the economics of managerial organizations by focusing on the decision problem of management. Ours is a "team theory" analysis, that is, it ignores the problem of conflicting objectives among managers and focuses instead on the problem of coordinating the decisions of several imperfectly informed actors. However, unlike classical team theory, we concentrate on the choice by managers of what to know, as well as what to do, and we allow the possibility that bounded rationality limits the managers' ability to understand subtle messages.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Volume (Year): 5 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622903|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sherwin Rosen, 1982. "Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 311-323, Autumn.
- Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1983. "Organizing Production in a Large Economy," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 672, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Beckmann, Martin J., 1977. "Management production functions and the theory of the firm," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-18, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jjieco:v:5:y:1991:i:3:p:205-225. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.