In a principal-agent model with hidden information and no monetary transfers, I establish the Veto-Power Principle: any incentive-compatible outcome can be implemented through veto-based delegation with an endogenously chosen default decision. This result demonstrates the exact nature of commitment powers required by the principal: (1) to design the default outcome and (2) to ensure that she has almost no formal control over the agent's decisions.
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- Anthony M. Marino, 2007. "Delegation versus Veto in Organizational Games of Strategic Communication," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(6), pages 979-992, December.
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