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Tymofiy Mylovanov

Personal Details

First Name:Tymofiy
Middle Name:
Last Name:Mylovanov
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pmy38
https://sites.google.com/site/tmylovanov/

Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of Pittsburgh

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (United States)
http://www.econ.pitt.edu/
RePEc:edi:depghus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Eraslan, Hulya & Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Yilmaz, Bilge, 2014. "Deliberation and Security Design in Bankruptcy," Working Papers 14-029, Rice University, Department of Economics.
  2. Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Tröger, Thomas, 2013. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: The Quasi-Linear Private-Values Case," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 437, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  3. Nicolas Klein & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2011. "Should the Flatterers be Avoided?," 2011 Meeting Papers 1273, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. Thomas Troeger & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2010. "Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Privacy of Information," 2010 Meeting Papers 1039, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  5. LI, Ming & MYLOVANOV, Tymofiy, 2010. "Credibility for Sale - The Effect of Disclosure on Information Acquisition and Transmission," Cahiers de recherche 08-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  6. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2008. "Contracts for Experts with Opposing Interests," Discussion Papers 5, Kyiv School of Economics, revised Feb 2010.
  7. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2007. "Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 6467, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Tröger, Thomas, 2006. "A Characterization of the Conditions for Optimal Auction with Resale," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 128, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  9. Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2005. "Veto-Based Delegation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 129, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  10. Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2005. "First-mover disadvantage," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 127, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  11. Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2004. "Failure to Delegate and Loss of Control," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 130, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    repec:qmw:qmwecw:wp674 is not listed on IDEAS

Articles

  1. Wagner, Christoph & Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Tröger, Thomas, 2015. "Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 280-289.
  2. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Thomas Tröger, 2014. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: Private Values with Transferable Utility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(4), pages 1668-1707.
  3. Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Zapechelnyuk, Andriy, 2013. "Decision rules revealing commonly known events," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 8-10.
  4. James Andreoni & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2012. "Diverging Opinions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 209-232, February.
  5. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Thomas Tröger, 2009. "Optimal auction with resale—a characterization of the conditions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(3), pages 509-528, September.
  6. Kovác, Eugen & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2009. "Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1373-1395, July.
  7. Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2008. "Veto-based delegation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 297-307, January.
  8. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Patrick Schmitz, 2008. "Task scheduling and moral hazard," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(2), pages 307-320, November.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Eraslan, Hulya & Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Yilmaz, Bilge, 2014. "Deliberation and Security Design in Bankruptcy," Working Papers 14-029, Rice University, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2016. "Optimal Allocation With Ex-Post Verification And Limited Penalties," Working Papers 2016_21, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    2. Dou, Winston Wei & Taylor, Lucian A. & Wang, Wei & Wang, Wenyu, 2021. "Dissecting bankruptcy frictions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(3), pages 975-1000.
    3. Makoto Hanazono & Yasutora Watanabe, 2018. "Equity bargaining with common value," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(2), pages 251-292, March.

  2. Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Tröger, Thomas, 2013. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: The Quasi-Linear Private-Values Case," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 437, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

    Cited by:

    1. Suehyun Kwon, 2018. "Selling Complementary Goods: Information and Products," CESifo Working Paper Series 7394, CESifo.
    2. Andras Niedermayer & Artyom Shneyerov, 2014. "For‐Profit Search Platforms," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55(3), pages 765-789, August.
    3. Wasser, Cédric & Loertscher, Simon, 2015. "Optimal Structure and Dissolution of Partnerships," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113112, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Jakub Kastl & Marco Pagnozzi & Salvatore Piccolo, 2015. "Selling Information to Competitive Firms," CSEF Working Papers 420, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    5. Xin Zhao, 2018. "Auction Design by an Informed Seller: The Optimality of Reserve Price Signaling," Working Paper Series 53, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
    6. Suehyun Kwon, 2019. "Informed-Principal Problem in Mechanisms with Limited Commitment," CESifo Working Paper Series 7513, CESifo.
    7. Suehyun Kwon, 2019. "Revelation Principle with Persistent Correlated Types: Impossibility Result," CESifo Working Paper Series 7782, CESifo.

  3. Thomas Troeger & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2010. "Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Privacy of Information," 2010 Meeting Papers 1039, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. Takeshi Nishimura, 2012. "Scoring Auction by an Informed Principal," Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series gd11-224, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.

  4. LI, Ming & MYLOVANOV, Tymofiy, 2010. "Credibility for Sale - The Effect of Disclosure on Information Acquisition and Transmission," Cahiers de recherche 08-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.

    Cited by:

    1. Wei Li, 2010. "Peddling Influence through Intermediaries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 1136-1162, June.

  5. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2007. "Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 6467, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Eva I. Hoppe & David J. Kusterer, 2010. "Conflicting Tasks and Moral Hazard: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 01-04, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences.
    2. Guillermo Ordoñez, 2013. "Reputation from nested activities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(3), pages 915-940, April.
    3. Makarov, Uliana, 2011. "Networking or not working: A model of social procrastination from communication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 574-585.
    4. Susanne Ohlendorf & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012. "Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory: The Case Of Risk‐Neutrality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(2), pages 433-452, May.
    5. Murali Agastya & Oleksii Birulin, 2023. "Optimal Task Scheduling under Adverse Selection and Hidden Actions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 660-698, May.
    6. Eric S. Chou & Chien-Lung Chen, 2015. "Can Agents Be Better Off with Pay Caps?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(4), pages 1069-1090, October.
    7. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Ohlendorf, Susanne, 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  6. Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Tröger, Thomas, 2006. "A Characterization of the Conditions for Optimal Auction with Resale," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 128, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

    Cited by:

    1. Garratt, Rodney, 2008. "Collusion via Resale," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 20/2008, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    2. Virag, Gabor, 2009. "First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders," MPRA Paper 17094, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  7. Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2005. "Veto-Based Delegation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 129, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

    Cited by:

    1. Liang, Pinghan, 2013. "Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary," MPRA Paper 45271, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2012. "Eliciting Information from a Committee," Working Papers 692, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    3. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(7), pages 1541-1563, July.
    4. Ricardo Alonso & Niko Matouschek, 2008. "Optimal Delegation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 75(1), pages 259-293.
    5. Anton Kolotilin & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2019. "Persuasion Meets Delegation," Papers 1902.02628, arXiv.org.
    6. Krähmer, Daniel & Kováč, Eugen, 2016. "Optimal sequential delegation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 849-888.
    7. Tigran Melkonyan, 2014. "Decentralization, Incentive Contracts and the Effect of Distortions in Performance Measures," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 82(6), pages 631-652, December.
    8. Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2007. "Delegation and Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 6042, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Tao Li, 2014. "Expert advising under checks and balances," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 477-502, February.
    10. Eric Schmidbauer & Dmitry Lubensky, 2016. "Equilibrium Informativeness in Veto-Based Delegation," Working Papers 2016-03, University of Central Florida, Department of Economics.
    11. Lubensky, Dmitry & Schmidbauer, Eric, 2018. "Equilibrium informativeness in veto games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 104-125.
    12. Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2013. "Exit Options and the Allocation of Authority," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 401, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    13. Xin Zhao, 2018. "Heterogeneity and Unanimity: Optimal Committees with Information Acquisition," Working Paper Series 52, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
    14. Dino Gerardi & Johannes Horner & Lucas Maestri, 2010. "The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1760R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Oct 2013.
    15. Fu, Qiang & Li, Ming, 2014. "Reputation-concerned policy makers and institutional status quo bias," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 15-25.
    16. Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hao & Li, Wei, 2013. "Optimal limited authority for principal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2344-2382.
    17. Yingni Guo, 2016. "Dynamic Delegation of Experimentation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(8), pages 1969-2008, August.
    18. Ruckes, Martin & Rønde, Thomas, 2010. "Dynamic incentives in organizations: Success and inertia," Working Paper Series in Economics 7, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
    19. Vladimir Karamychev & Bauke Visser, 2017. "Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(3), pages 813-850, August.
    20. David Jiménez-Gómez, 2018. "The Evolution of Self-Control in the Brain," Working Papers. Serie AD 2018-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    21. Li Ming, 2010. "Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-24, April.
    22. Arve, Malin & Honryo, Takakazu, 2015. "Delegation and Communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 524, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    23. Takashi Shimizu, 2017. "Cheap talk with an exit option: a model of exit and voice," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1071-1088, November.
    24. Noam Tanner, 2018. "Optimal Delegation Under Unknown Bias: The Role of Concavity," Supervisory Research and Analysis Working Papers RPA 18-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    25. Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Bargaining in the Appointment Process, Constrained Delegation and the Political Weight of the Senate," MPRA Paper 6988, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    26. Vincent Anesi & Daniel J. Seidmann, 2009. "Optimal Delegation with a Finite Number of States," Discussion Papers 2009-20, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    27. Florence Lachet-Touya, 2019. "The Assignment of a CSR Level of Action: Rule vs Discretion," Working Papers hal-02141052, HAL.
    28. Garfagnini, Umberto & Ottaviani, Marco & Sørensen, Peter Norman, 2014. "Accept or reject? An organizational perspective," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 66-74.
    29. Ambrus, Attila & Azevedo, Eduardo M. & Kamada, Yuichiro & Takagi, Yuki, 2013. "Legislative committees as information intermediaries: A unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 103-115.
    30. Saori CHIBA & Kaiwen LEONG, 2018. "Information Aggregation and Countervailing Biases in Organizations," Discussion papers e-18-007, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.

Articles

  1. Wagner, Christoph & Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Tröger, Thomas, 2015. "Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 280-289.

    Cited by:

    1. Koessler, Frederic & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2019. "Selling with evidence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
    2. Schumacher, Heiner & Thysen, Heidi Christina, 2022. "Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(1), January.
    3. Skreta, Vasiliki & Koessler, Frédéric, 2022. "Informed Information Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 17028, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Skreta, Vasiliki & Koessler, Frédéric, 2021. "Information Design by an Informed Designer," CEPR Discussion Papers 15709, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Takeshi Nishimura, 2019. "Informed Principal Problems in Bilateral Trading," Papers 1906.10311, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
    6. Nicholas Charles Bedard, 2017. "Contracts in informed-principal problems with moral hazard," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 21-34, April.
    7. Nishimura, Takeshi, 2022. "Informed principal problems in bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    8. Teddy Mekonnen, 2021. "Informed principal, moral hazard, and limited liability," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(1), pages 119-142, April.
    9. Frances Xu Lee & Yuk‐fai Fong, 2017. "Signaling by an informed service provider," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(4), pages 955-968, December.

  2. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Thomas Tröger, 2014. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: Private Values with Transferable Utility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(4), pages 1668-1707.

    Cited by:

    1. Frédéric Koessler & Vassiliki Skreta, 2016. "Informed seller with taste heterogeneity," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01379293, HAL.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
    3. Koessler, Frederic & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2019. "Selling with evidence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
    4. Charles Z. Zheng, 2016. "Goethe's secret reserve price," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 12(1), pages 41-48, March.
    5. Anastasios Dosis, 2019. "On the Informed Principal Model with Common Values ," Working Papers hal-02130454, HAL.
    6. Suehyun Kwon, 2018. "Selling Complementary Goods: Information and Products," CESifo Working Paper Series 7394, CESifo.
    7. Gorkem Celik & Okan Yilankaya, 2015. "Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1501, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    8. Jin Yeub Kim, 2022. "Neutral public good mechanisms," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(4), pages 1-16, April.
    9. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Alex Smolin, 2017. "The Design and Price of Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2049R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    10. Takeshi Nishimura, 2019. "Informed Principal Problems in Bilateral Trading," Papers 1906.10311, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
    11. Eric van Damme & Xu Lang, 2022. "Two-Person Bargaining when the Disagreement Point is Private Information," Papers 2211.06830, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
    12. Markus Brunnermeier & Rohit Lamba & Carlos Segura-Rodriguez, 2020. "Inverse Selection," Working Papers 2020-50, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    13. Nishimura, Takeshi, 2022. "Informed principal problems in bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    14. Troyan, Peter, 2017. "Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 319-345.
    15. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2023. "On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1051-1067, November.
    16. Balkenborg, Dieter & Makris, Miltiadis, 2015. "An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 918-958.
    17. Teddy Mekonnen, 2021. "Informed principal, moral hazard, and limited liability," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(1), pages 119-142, April.
    18. Wagner, Christoph & Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Tröger, Thomas, 2015. "Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 280-289.
    19. Suehyun Kwon, 2019. "Informed-Principal Problem in Mechanisms with Limited Commitment," CESifo Working Paper Series 7513, CESifo.
    20. Francesco Giovannoni & Toomas Hinnosaar, 2022. "Pricing Novel Goods," Papers 2208.04985, arXiv.org.
    21. Suehyun Kwon, 2019. "Revelation Principle with Persistent Correlated Types: Impossibility Result," CESifo Working Paper Series 7782, CESifo.
    22. Xin Zhao, 2023. "Auction design by an informed seller: A foundation of reserve price signalling," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(3), pages 1161-1190, August.
    23. Mingshi Kang & Charles Z. Zheng, 2023. "Optimal design for redistributions among endogenous buyers and sellers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(4), pages 1141-1180, May.
    24. Vasconcelos, Luís, 2017. "A signaling-based theory of contractual commitment to relationships," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 123-138.

  3. Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Zapechelnyuk, Andriy, 2013. "Decision rules revealing commonly known events," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 8-10.

    Cited by:

    1. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2012. "Eliciting Information from a Committee," Working Papers 692, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    2. Migrow, Dimitri, 2018. "Designing Communication Hierarchies," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 44, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    3. Ambrus, Attila & Lu, Shih En, 2014. "Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 174-189.
    4. Migrow, Dimitri, 2021. "Designing communication hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).

  4. James Andreoni & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2012. "Diverging Opinions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 209-232, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Pierre Benoît & Juan Dubra, 2018. "When do populations polarize? An explanation," Documentos de Trabajo/Working Papers 1801, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo..
    2. Tilman Borgers & Angel Hernanco-Veciana & Daniel Krohmer, 2010. "When are Signals Complements or Substitutes," Discussion Papers 1488, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Olszewski, Wojciech, 2021. "Preferences and information processing under vague information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    4. Alice Hsiaw & Ing-Haw Cheng, 2016. "Distrust in Experts and the Origins of Disagreement," Working Papers 110R3, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Business School, revised Mar 2018.
    5. Stone, Daniel, 2018. ""Unmotivated Bias" and Partisan Hostility: Empirical Evidence," SocArXiv hr5ba, Center for Open Science.
    6. Piotr Evdokimov & Umberto Garfagnini, 2023. "Cognitive Ability and Perceived Disagreement in Learning," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 381, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    7. Isabel Melguizo, 2017. "Homophily and the Persistence of Disagreement," Working Paper Series Sobre México 2017001, Sobre México. Temas en economía.
    8. Daniel J. Benjamin, 2018. "Errors in Probabilistic Reasoning and Judgment Biases," GRU Working Paper Series GRU_2018_023, City University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics and Finance, Global Research Unit.
    9. Isaac Loh & Gregory Phelan, 2019. "Dimensionality And Disagreement: Asymptotic Belief Divergence In Response To Common Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1861-1876, November.
    10. Le Yaouanq, Yves, 2018. "A Model of Ideological Thinking," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 85, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    11. Azzimonti, Marina & Fernandes, Marcos, 2023. "Social media networks, fake news, and polarization," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    12. Thakor, Anjan V., 2015. "Strategic information disclosure when there is fundamental disagreement," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 131-153.
    13. Marcos Fernandes, 2019. "Confirmation Bias in Social Networks," Department of Economics Working Papers 19-05, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
    14. Stone, Daniel, 2018. "Just a big misunderstanding? Bias and Bayesian affective polarization," SocArXiv 58sru, Center for Open Science.
    15. Daniel F. Stone, 2016. "A few bad apples: Communication in the presence of strategic ideologues," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 83(2), pages 487-500, October.
    16. Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Dubra, Juan, 2014. "A Theory of Rational Attitude Polarization," MPRA Paper 60129, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Ceren Baysan, 2017. "Can More Information Lead to More Voter Polarization? Experimental Evidence from Turkey," 2017 Papers pba1551, Job Market Papers.
    18. Jeong, Daeyoung, 2019. "Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 50-80.
    19. Hassan Afrouzi & Carolina Arteaga & Emily Weisburst, 2022. "Can Leaders Persuade? Examining Movement in Immigration Beliefs," CESifo Working Paper Series 9593, CESifo.
    20. Stone, Daniel F., 2019. "“Unmotivated bias” and partisan hostility: Empirical evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 12-26.

  5. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Thomas Tröger, 2009. "Optimal auction with resale—a characterization of the conditions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(3), pages 509-528, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    2. Xiaogang Che & Tilman Klumpp, 2023. "Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(4), pages 1207-1245, May.
    3. Che, XiaoGang & Lee, Peter & Yang, Yibai, 2013. "The impact of resale on entry in second price auctions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 163-168.

  6. Kovác, Eugen & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2009. "Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1373-1395, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Frankel, 2014. "Aligned Delegation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(1), pages 66-83, January.
    2. Ambrus, Attila & Egorov, Georgy, 2017. "Delegation and nonmonetary incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 101-135.
    3. Kos, Nenad & Messner, Matthias, 2013. "Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 12-14.
    4. Liang, Pinghan, 2013. "Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary," MPRA Paper 45271, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Goltsman, Maria & Hörner, Johannes & Pavlov, Gregory & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Mediation, arbitration and negotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1397-1420, July.
    6. Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi, 2020. "Relational Communication," Discussion Papers 2018-12b, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    7. Amador, Manuel & Bagwell, Kyle, 2020. "Money burning in the theory of delegation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 382-412.
    8. Maxim Ivanov, 2021. "Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 955-1000, October.
    9. Silvia Dominguez Martinez & Randolph Sloof, 2016. "Communication versus (Restricted) Delegation: An Experimental Comparison," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 16-050/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    10. Sarah Auster & Nicola Pavoni, 2020. "Limited Awareness and Financial Intermediation," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2020_252, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    11. Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, 2010. "A Model of Delegated Project Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(1), pages 213-244, January.
    12. Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2020. "Delegating performance evaluation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
    13. Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack, 2021. "Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2021_288, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    14. Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "Optimal Voting Rules," Working Papers tecipa-493, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    15. Ricardo Alonso & Niko Matouschek, 2008. "Optimal Delegation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 75(1), pages 259-293.
    16. Alex Frankel, 2021. "Selecting Applicants," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(2), pages 615-645, March.
    17. Blume, Andreas & Deimen, Inga & Inoue, Sean, 2022. "Incomplete contracts versus communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    18. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2005. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Discussion Papers 05-08, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, revised Nov 2009.
    19. Anton Kolotilin & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2019. "Persuasion Meets Delegation," Papers 1902.02628, arXiv.org.
    20. Lim, Wooyoung, 2014. "Communication in bargaining over decision rights," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 159-179.
    21. Carrasco, Vinicius & Fuchs, William & Fukuda, Satoshi, 2019. "From equals to despots: The dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 402-432.
    22. Krähmer, Daniel & Kováč, Eugen, 2016. "Optimal sequential delegation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 849-888.
    23. Frédéric Koessler & David Martimort, 2012. "Optimal Delegation with Multi-dimensional Decisions," Post-Print halshs-00754576, HAL.
    24. Sarah Auster & Nicola Pavoni, 2021. "Optimal Delegation and Information Transmission under Limited Awareness," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 059, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    25. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2010. "Decision Rules for Experts with Opposing Interests," Working Papers 674, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    26. Yeon-Koo Che & Wouter Dessein & Navin Kartik, 2010. "Pandering to Persuade," Levine's Bibliography 661465000000000163, UCLA Department of Economics.
    27. Ivanov, Maxim, 2014. "Beneficial mediated communication in cheap talk," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 129-135.
    28. Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2008. "Veto-based delegation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 297-307, January.
    29. Auster, Sarah & Pavoni, Nicola, 2024. "Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
    30. Semenov, Aggey, 2012. "Delegation to potentially uninformed agent," MPRA Paper 42080, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    31. Manuel Amador & Kyle Bagwell & Alex Frankel, 2018. "A note on interval delegation," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 6(2), pages 239-249, October.
    32. Alex Frankel, 2016. "Delegating Multiple Decisions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 16-53, November.
    33. Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hao & Li, Wei, 2013. "Optimal limited authority for principal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2344-2382.
    34. Frédéric Koessler & David Martimort, 2008. "Multidimensional communication mechanisms: cooperative and conflicting designs," PSE Working Papers halshs-00586854, HAL.
    35. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Informational control and organizational design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 721-751, March.
    36. Noam Tanner, 2018. "Optimal Delegation Under Unknown Bias: The Role of Concavity," Supervisory Research and Analysis Working Papers RPA 18-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    37. Vincent Anesi & Daniel J. Seidmann, 2009. "Optimal Delegation with a Finite Number of States," Discussion Papers 2009-20, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    38. Gan, Tan & Hu, Ju & Weng, Xi, 2023. "Optimal contingent delegation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    39. Andreas Kleiner, 2022. "Optimal Delegation in a Multidimensional World," Papers 2208.11835, arXiv.org.
    40. Pinghan Liang, 2017. "Transfer of authority within hierarchies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(4), pages 273-290, December.
    41. Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "Optimal Mechanism Design without Money," Working Papers tecipa-481, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    42. Pinghan Liang, 2010. "Transfer of Authority within Hierarchy," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000139, David K. Levine.
    43. Siguang Li & Xi Weng, 2017. "Random Authority," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(1), pages 211-235, February.
    44. Andreas Blume & Oliver Board & Kohei Kawamura, 2007. "Noisy Talk," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 167, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    45. Lim, Wooyoung, 2012. "Selling authority," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 393-415.
    46. Ambrus, Attila & Azevedo, Eduardo M. & Kamada, Yuichiro & Takagi, Yuki, 2013. "Legislative committees as information intermediaries: A unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 103-115.

  7. Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2008. "Veto-based delegation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 297-307, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Patrick Schmitz, 2008. "Task scheduling and moral hazard," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(2), pages 307-320, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.

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NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 8 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (4) 2006-07-15 2010-12-04 2013-11-02 2015-08-30
  2. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (3) 2006-07-15 2007-09-24 2008-02-09
  3. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (2) 2006-07-15 2010-12-04
  4. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (2) 2010-12-04 2013-11-02
  5. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (2) 2010-12-04 2013-11-02
  6. NEP-GER: German Papers (1) 2015-08-30
  7. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2010-12-04

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