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Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Privacy of Information

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Listed:
  • Thomas Troeger

    (University of Bern)

  • Tymofiy Mylovanov

    (Penn State University)

Abstract

do better than when her information is public.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Troeger & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2010. "Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Privacy of Information," 2010 Meeting Papers 1039, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:sed010:1039
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    File URL: https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2010/paper_1039.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yilankaya, Okan, 1999. "A Note on the Seller's Optimal Mechanism in Bilateral Trade with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 267-271, July.
    2. Fleckinger, Pierre, 2007. "Informed principal and countervailing incentives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 240-244, February.
    3. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
    4. Chade, Hector & Silvers, Randy, 2002. "Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 291-300, February.
    5. Isa Hafalir & Vijay Krishna, 2008. "Asymmetric Auctions with Resale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 87-112, March.
    6. Jean Tirole, 2006. "The Theory of Corporate Finance," Post-Print hal-00173191, HAL.
    7. Haile, Philip A., 2003. "Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 72-110, January.
    8. Charles Zhoucheng Zheng, 2002. "Optimal Auction with Resale," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2197-2224, November.
    9. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721.
    10. Mezzetti, Claudio & Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 2000. "Gathering information before signing a contract with a privately informed principal," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 667-689, May.
    11. Severinov, Sergei, 2008. "An efficient solution to the informed principal problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 114-133, July.
    12. Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Takeshi Nishimura, 2012. "Scoring Auction by an Informed Principal," Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series gd11-224, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.

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