Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Privacy of Information
do better than when her information is public.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA|
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- Chade, Hector & Silvers, Randy, 2002.
"Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology,"
Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 291-300, February.
- Hector Chade & Randolph Silvers, "undated". "Informed Principal, Moral Hazard, and the Value of a More Informative Technology," Working Papers 2133302, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University.
- Milgrom,Paul, 2004.
"Putting Auction Theory to Work,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521551847, May.
- Yilankaya, Okan, 1999. "A Note on the Seller's Optimal Mechanism in Bilateral Trade with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 267-271, July.
- Jean Tirole, 2006. "The Theory of Corporate Finance," Post-Print hal-00173191, HAL.
- Severinov, Sergei, 2008. "An efficient solution to the informed principal problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 114-133, July.
- Mezzetti, Claudio & Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 2000. "Gathering information before signing a contract with a privately informed principal," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 667-689, May.
- Haile, Philip A., 2003. "Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 72-110, January.
- Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
- Fleckinger, Pierre, 2007. "Informed principal and countervailing incentives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 240-244, February.
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