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Collusion under asymmetric information
[[Collusion en information asymétrique]]

Author

Listed:
  • J.J. Laffont

    (Inconnu)

  • D. Martimort

    (Station d'économie et sociologie rurales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

Abstract

Quand il s'applique aux groupes d'agents, le Principe de Révélation postule un comportement de Nash Bayésien entre les agents. On suppose que ces derniers se comportent de façon non coopérative, c'est-à-dire que des contrats les liant ne sont pas possibles ou que le principal peut les empêcher à un coût nul. Cette hypothèse peut être interprétée comme résultant de l'existence de grands coûts de communication entre les agents d'une organisation ou de l'impossibilité pour le principal d'empêcher cette communication à un coût nul. Dans cet article, on relaxe cette hypothèse. On analyse un problème de conception de mécanismes dans lequel les agents peuvent ouvrir des canaux de communication entre eux et faire collusion soit en information complète, soit en information incomplète. Dans chacun de ces cas, on caractérise l'ensemble des contrats implémentables robustes à la collusion, on isole les noeuds et les enjeux de collusion et on optimise la fonction objectif du principal. On se livre ensuite à plusieurs exercices de statistique comparative, on discute le concept de robustesse à la collusion et on offre quelques vues générales sur l'origine des coûts de transaction dans les contrats cachés.

Suggested Citation

  • J.J. Laffont & D. Martimort, 1997. "Collusion under asymmetric information [[Collusion en information asymétrique]]," Post-Print hal-02686625, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02686625
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02686625
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    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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