IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ecm/emetrp/v65y1997i4p875-912.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Collusion under Asymmetric Information

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-Jacques Laffont
  • David Martimort

Abstract

When applied to groups, the revelation principle postulates a Bayesian-Nash behavior between agents. Their binding agreements are unenforceable or the principal can prevent them at no cost. The authors analyze instead a mechanism design problem in which the agents can communicate between themselves and collude under asymmetric information. They characterize the set of implementable collusion-proof contracts both when the principal offers anonymous and nonanonymous contracts. After having isolated the nexi and the stakes of collusion, the authors proceed to normative analysis, do some comparative statics, discuss their concept of collusion-proofness, and provide some insights about transaction costs in side-contracting.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1997. "Collusion under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 875-912, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:65:y:1997:i:4:p:875-912
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Debreu, Gerard, 1974. "Excess demand functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 15-21, March.
    2. Kannai, Yakar, 1977. "Concavifiability and constructions of concave utility functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 1-56, March.
    3. Debreu, Gerard, 1976. "Least concave utility functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 121-129, July.
    4. Muellbauer, John, 1976. "Community Preferences and the Representative Consumer," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(5), pages 979-999, September.
    5. Hildenbrand, Werner, 1983. "On the "Law of Demand."," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 997-1019, July.
    6. Polterovich, Victor & Mityushin, Leonid, 1978. "Criteria for Monotonicity of Demand Functions," MPRA Paper 20097, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. John Muellbauer, 1975. "Aggregation, Income Distribution and Consumer Demand," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(4), pages 525-543.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:65:y:1997:i:4:p:875-912. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/essssea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.