Optimal Auction with Resale
This paper investigates the design of seller-optimal auctions when winning bidders can attempt to resell the good. In that case, the optimal allocation characterized by Myerson (1981) cannot be achieved without resale. I find a sufficient and necessary condition for sincere bidding given the possibility of resale. In two-bidder cases, I prove that the Myerson allocation can be achieved under standard conditions supplemented with two assumptions. With three or more bidders, achieving the Myerson allocation is more difficult. I prove that it can be implemented in special cases. In those cases, the Myerson allocation is generated through a sequence of resale auctions, each optimally chosen by a reseller. (This paper was not from my dissertation.)
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|Date of creation:||01 Nov 2002|
|Publication status:||Published in Econometrica, November 2002, vol. 70 no. 6, pp. 2197-2224|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070|
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
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