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On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure

  • Vasiliki Skreta

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 843644000000000222.

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Date of creation: 22 Jul 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000222
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  4. Neeman, Z., 1998. "The Relevance of Private Infromation in Mechanism Design," Papers 93, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  5. Bergemann, Dirk & Välimäki, Juuso, 2006. "Information in Mechanism Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 5494, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Cai, Hongbin & Riley, John & Ye, Lixin, 2007. "Reserve price signaling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 253-268, July.
  7. Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa, 2008. "The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design," Working Papers 08-12, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  8. Yilankaya, Okan, 1999. "A Note on the Seller's Optimal Mechanism in Bilateral Trade with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 267-271, July.
  9. Rolf Tisljar, 2002. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal - Pure-Strategy Equilibria for a Common Value Model," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse21_2002, University of Bonn, Germany.
  10. Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2007. "Information structures in optimal auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 580-609, November.
  11. Cella, Michela, 2008. "Informed principal with correlation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 433-456, November.
  12. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Discussion Papers 481, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. McAfee, R Preston & Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 395-421, March.
  14. John G. Riley & William Samuelson, 1979. "Optimal Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 152, UCLA Department of Economics.
  15. Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1992. "Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 378-399, April.
  16. Todd Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2012. "Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 50(2), pages 269-302, June.
  17. Aviad Heifetz & Zvika Neeman, 2004. "On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design," Discussion Paper Series dp350, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  18. Lebrun, Bernard, 1997. "First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case," Cahiers de recherche 9715, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
  19. Mares, Vlad & Harstad, Ronald M., 2003. "Private information revelation in common-value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 264-282, April.
  20. Hansen, Robert G, 2001. "Auctions of Companies," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(1), pages 30-43, January.
  21. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1994. "Auctions vs. Negotiations," NBER Working Papers 4608, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Ichiro Obara, 2006. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001206, UCLA Department of Economics.
  23. M. Landsberger & J. Rubinstein & E. Wolfstetter & S. Zamir, 1996. "First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations is Common Knowledge," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1996,36, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  24. Jullien, Bruno & Mariotti, Thomas, 2002. "Auction and the Informed Seller Problem," IDEI Working Papers 145, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Oct 2004.
  25. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "Multistage Games with Communication," Discussion Papers 590, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  26. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
  27. Figueroa, Nicols & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2009. "A note on optimal allocation mechanisms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 102(3), pages 169-173, March.
  28. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1992. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 1-42, January.
  29. Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "Optimal Auctions with General Distributions," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000227, UCLA Department of Economics.
  30. Ye, Lixin, 2007. "Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 181-207, January.
  31. Simon Board, 2009. "Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 125-135, January.
  32. Péter Eső & Balázs Szentes, 2007. "Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 705-731.
  33. Nicolás Figueroa & Vasiliki Skreta, 2011. "Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(3), pages 213-243, September.
  34. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 379-409, March.
  35. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521551847, Junio.
  36. Paul Milgrom & Ilya Segal, 2002. "Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 583-601, March.
  37. Nicolás Figueroa & Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "Note on Optimal Auctions," Documentos de Trabajo 232, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  38. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On The Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-Unit Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 895-900, July.
  39. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-57, November.
  40. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers 284, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  41. Lucia Quesada, 2005. "Collusion as an Informed Principal Problem," Game Theory and Information 0504002, EconWPA.
  42. Juan José Ganuza & José S. Penalva, 2006. "On information and competition in private value auctions," Economics Working Papers 937, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jul 2006.
  43. Juan-José Ganuza & José S. Penalva Zuasti, 2005. "On Information And Competition In Private Value Auctions," Working Papers wp2005_0503, CEMFI.
  44. Juan José Ganuza, 2003. "Ignorance promotes competition: An auction model with endogenous private valuations," Economics Working Papers 671, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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