A Note on Optimal Allocation Mechanisms
When the buyer's utility is non-linear in type, revenue-maximizing mechanisms for multiple goods may be random. This happens when the allocation rule obtained via pointwise optimization is not incentive compatible, which is possible even with strictly increasing virtual utilities.
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