Informed principal with correlation
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- Michela CELLA, 2007. "Informed principal with correlation," Departmental Working Papers 2007-11, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
- Michela Cella, 2006. "Informed Principal with Correlation," Economics Series Working Papers 261, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Tröger, Thomas & Mylovanov, Timofiy, 2012.
"Mechanism design by an informed principal: the quasi-linear private-values case,"
Working Papers
12-14, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
- Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Tröger, Thomas, 2013. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: The Quasi-Linear Private-Values Case," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 437, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Michela Cella, 2005.
"Risky allocations from a risk-neutral informed principal,"
Review of Economic Design,
Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 9(3), pages 191-202, August.
- Michela Cella, 2005. "Risky Allocations from a Risk-Neutral Informed Principal," Economics Series Working Papers 234, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Vasiliki Skreta, 2011.
"On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure,"
Review of Economic Design,
Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(1), pages 1-36, March.
- Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000222, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Vasiliki Skreta, 2008. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Working Papers 08-10, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001789, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Bedard, Nicholas C., 2017. "The strategically ignorant principal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 548-561.
- Thomas Tröger & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2008. "Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Private Information," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse21_2008, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Feess,Eberhard & Schieble,Michael & Markus,Walzl, 2004. "When should principals acquire verifiable information?," Research Memorandum 049, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Balkenborg, Dieter & Makris, Miltiadis, 2015. "An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 918-958.
- Mohammad Davoodalhosseini, 2017. "Constrained Efficiency with Adverse Selection and Directed Search," Staff Working Papers 17-15, Bank of Canada.
- Mylovanov, Timofiy & Tröger, Thomas, 2012. "Informed principal problems in generalized private values environments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
- Pierre Fleckinger, 2007. "Informed Principal and Countervailing Incentives," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00607075, HAL.
- Cho, Wonjoo & Blandford, David, 2015. "Bilateral information asymmetry and irreversible practice adoption through agri-environmental policy: an application to peat land retirement in Norway," 89th Annual Conference, April 13-15, 2015, Warwick University, Coventry, UK 204212, Agricultural Economics Society.
More about this item
Keywords
Informed principal Private values Correlation;JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
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