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Michela Cella

Personal Details

First Name:Michela
Middle Name:
Last Name:Cella
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pce42
http://dipeco.economia.unimib.it/persone/cella/
Terminal Degree:2003 Economics Department; London School of Economics (LSE) (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Dipartimento di Economia, Metodi Quantitativi e Strategie d'Impresa (DEMS)
Scuola di Economia e Statistica
Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca

Milano, Italy
http://www.dems.unimib.it/

: +39 02 6448 3089
+39 02 6448 3085
Piazza Ateneo Nuovo, 1 Milano 20126
RePEc:edi:dpmibit (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Federico Etro & Michela Cella, 2010. "EQUILIBRIUM PRINCIPAL-AGENT CONTRACTS Competition and R&D Incentives," Working Papers 180, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2010.
  2. Federco Etro & Michela Cella, 2010. "Oligopolistic Screening and Two-way distortion," Working Papers 200, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2010.
  3. Michela Cella & Massimo Florio, 2009. "Hierarchical contracting in grant decisions: ex-ante and ex-post evaluation in the context of the EURegional Policy," Working Papers 171, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2009.
  4. Michela Cella, 2006. "Informed Principal with Correlation," Economics Series Working Papers 261, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  5. Michela Cella, 2005. "Monitoring Subcontracting in a Suppliers` Hierachy," Economics Series Working Papers 233, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  6. Michela Cella, 2005. "Risky Allocations from a Risk-Neutral Informed Principal," Economics Series Working Papers 234, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  7. Termini, Valeria & Cella, Michela, 1999. "La funzione economica del contratto di servizio nella trasformazione in spa delle aziende di servizi pubblici locali
    [The economic function of the contract for local utilities]
    ," MPRA Paper 22486, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Articles

  1. Michela Cella, 2011. "Monitoring subcontracting in a suppliers' hierarchy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 523-548, July.
  2. Cella, Michela, 2008. "Informed principal with correlation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 433-456, November.
  3. Michela Cella, 2005. "Risky allocations from a risk-neutral informed principal," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 9(3), pages 191-202, August.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Federico Etro & Michela Cella, 2010. "EQUILIBRIUM PRINCIPAL-AGENT CONTRACTS Competition and R&D Incentives," Working Papers 180, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2010.

    Cited by:

    1. Ennasri, Ahmed & Willinger, Marc, 2014. "Incentives and managerial effort under competitive pressure: An experiment," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(4), pages 324-337.
    2. Michela, Cella & Federico, Etro, 2016. "Contract Competition between Hierarchies, Managerial Compensation and Imperfectly Correlated Shocks," Working Papers 328, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 07 Feb 2016.
    3. Federco Etro & Michela Cella, 2010. "Oligopolistic Screening and Two-way distortion," Working Papers 200, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2010.
    4. Federico Etro, 2014. "Some thoughts on the Sutton approach," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 112(2), pages 99-113, June.

  2. Federco Etro & Michela Cella, 2010. "Oligopolistic Screening and Two-way distortion," Working Papers 200, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2010.

    Cited by:

    1. Salvatore Piccolo, 2011. "Communicating Vertical Hierarchies: the Adverse Selection Case," CSEF Working Papers 273, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.

  3. Michela Cella & Massimo Florio, 2009. "Hierarchical contracting in grant decisions: ex-ante and ex-post evaluation in the context of the EURegional Policy," Working Papers 171, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2009.

    Cited by:

    1. Massimo Florio & Silvia Vignetti, 2008. "Building a bridge across CBA traditions: the contribution of EU Regional Policy," Working Papers 200908, CSIL Centre for Industrial Studies.
    2. Socorro, M. Pilar & De Rus, Ginés, 2011. "Infrastructure investment and incentives with supranational funding," Working Papers 2011-13, FEDEA.
    3. Massimo Florio & Silvia Vignetti, 2013. "The use of ex post Cost-Benefit Analysis to assess the long-term effects of Major Infrastructure Projects," Working Papers 201302, CSIL Centre for Industrial Studies.
    4. Chiara Del Bo & Massimo Florio, 2012. "Public enterprises, planning and policy adoption: three welfare propositions," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(4), pages 263-279, December.

  4. Michela Cella, 2006. "Informed Principal with Correlation," Economics Series Working Papers 261, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Tröger, Thomas & Mylovanov, Timofiy, 2012. "Mechanism design by an informed principal: the quasi-linear private-values case," Working Papers 12-14, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    2. Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001789, UCLA Department of Economics.
    3. Mylovanov, Timofiy & Tröger, Thomas, 2012. "Informed principal problems in generalized private values environments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    4. Pierre Fleckinger, 2007. "Informed Principal and Countervailing Incentives," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00607075, HAL.
    5. Michela Cella, 2005. "Risky allocations from a risk-neutral informed principal," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 9(3), pages 191-202, August.
    6. Bedard, Nicholas C., 2017. "The strategically ignorant principal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 548-561.
    7. Feess,Eberhard & Schieble,Michael & Markus,Walzl, 2004. "When should principals acquire verifiable information?," Research Memorandum 049, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    8. Balkenborg, Dieter & Makris, Miltiadis, 2015. "An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 918-958.
    9. Mohammad Davoodalhosseini, 2017. "Constrained Efficiency with Adverse Selection and Directed Search," Staff Working Papers 17-15, Bank of Canada.
    10. Cho, Wonjoo & Blandford, David, 2015. "Bilateral information asymmetry and irreversible practice adoption through agri-environmental policy: an application to peat land retirement in Norway," 89th Annual Conference, April 13-15, 2015, Warwick University, Coventry, UK 204212, Agricultural Economics Society.

  5. Michela Cella, 2005. "Risky Allocations from a Risk-Neutral Informed Principal," Economics Series Working Papers 234, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Cho, Wonjoo & Blandford, David, 2015. "Bilateral information asymmetry and irreversible practice adoption through agri-environmental policy: an application to peat land retirement in Norway," 89th Annual Conference, April 13-15, 2015, Warwick University, Coventry, UK 204212, Agricultural Economics Society.

Articles

  1. Cella, Michela, 2008. "Informed principal with correlation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 433-456, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Michela Cella, 2005. "Risky allocations from a risk-neutral informed principal," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 9(3), pages 191-202, August.
    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of articles recorded.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 7 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (3) 2009-11-07 2009-11-07 2010-03-28
  2. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (1) 2010-03-28
  3. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2010-03-28
  4. NEP-EEC: European Economics (1) 2009-11-07
  5. NEP-FMK: Financial Markets (1) 2006-03-18
  6. NEP-GEO: Economic Geography (1) 2009-11-07
  7. NEP-INO: Innovation (1) 2010-03-28
  8. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2009-11-07
  9. NEP-TID: Technology & Industrial Dynamics (1) 2010-03-28
  10. NEP-UPT: Utility Models & Prospect Theory (1) 2006-03-18

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