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Hierarchical contracting in grant decisions: ex-ante and ex-post evaluation in the context of the EURegional Policy

Author

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  • Michela Cella

    ()

  • Massimo Florio

Abstract

This paper applies incentive theory to the context of the European Union (EU) Regional Policy. The core instruments of the policy are the Structural Funds, capital grants that ?ow from the European Commission (EC) to Mem- ber States and regional authorities to promote investment and growth at local level. The EU grants need a co-payment by the regional government and do not cover in full the investment cost. We model this situation, similar to several other supra- national or federal contexts, as a simple principal-supervisor-agent model of the investment game between a supranational player (the principal), such as the EC, a non (fully) benevolent regional government (the supervisor), and a private ?rm (the executing agency). We show how the role of providers of additional information, the region (ex-ante) and an evaluator (ex-post) is crucial to reducing the optimal value of the grant and to improving the inef- ?ciencies caused by asymmetric information at the grant decision stage in a federal hierarchy

Suggested Citation

  • Michela Cella & Massimo Florio, 2009. "Hierarchical contracting in grant decisions: ex-ante and ex-post evaluation in the context of the EURegional Policy," Working Papers 171, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2009.
  • Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:171
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    File URL: http://dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper171.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2009
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Massimo Florio & Silvia Vignetti, 2008. "Building a bridge across CBA traditions: the contribution of EU Regional Policy," Working Papers 200908, CSIL Centre for Industrial Studies.
    2. Ginés Rus & M. Socorro, 2010. "Infrastructure Investment and Incentives with Supranational Funding," Transition Studies Review, Springer;Central Eastern European University Network (CEEUN), vol. 17(3), pages 551-567, September.
    3. Chiara Del Bo & Massimo Florio, 2012. "Public enterprises, planning and policy adoption: three welfare propositions," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(4), pages 263-279, December.
    4. Massimo Florio & Silvia Vignetti, 2013. "The use of ex post Cost-Benefit Analysis to assess the long-term effects of Major Infrastructure Projects," Working Papers 201302, CSIL Centre for Industrial Studies.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Hierarchical contracting; project evaluation; EU Regional Policy;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • R58 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Regional Development Planning and Policy

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