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Tax competition and revelation of preferences for public expenditure

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  • BUCOVETSKY, Sam

    (York University and Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain la Neuve, Belgium)

  • MARCHAND, Maurice

    (Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) and Institut d'Administration et de Gestion (IAG), Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain la Neuve, Belgium)

  • PESTIEAU, Pierre

    () (Université de Liège and Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain la Neuve, Belgium)

Abstract

This paper considers a federal country composed of local jurisdictions which differ in their taste for public goods and finance public spending by a source-based tax on capital income. The taste for public goods is private information of jurisdictions. By transferring differential grants to jurisdictions the central government aims at both reducing the misallocation of capital due to the diverging jurisdictional tax rates on capital income and getting closer to the optimal balance between private and public consumption in every jurisdiction. The purpose of the paper is to characterize the optimal grant policy of the central government. It is shown that there persist at the optimum both some misallocation of capital and some violation of the Samuelson rule in every jurisdiction.

Suggested Citation

  • BUCOVETSKY, Sam & MARCHAND, Maurice & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 1997. "Tax competition and revelation of preferences for public expenditure," CORE Discussion Papers 1997003, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1997003
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    File URL: https://uclouvain.be/en/research-institutes/immaq/core/dp-1997.html
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1994. "Representative democracy and capital taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 53-70, September.
    2. Gordon, Roger H & Bovenberg, A Lans, 1996. "Why Is Capital So Immobile Internationally? Possible Explanations and Implications for Capital Income Taxation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1057-1075, December.
    3. Massimo Bordignon & Paolo Manasse & Guido Tabellini, 2001. "Optimal Regional Redistribution under Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 709-723, June.
    4. LOPEZ, Salvador & MARCHAND, Maurice & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 1996. "A Simple Two-Country Model of Redistributive Capital Income Taxation," CORE Discussion Papers 1996025, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. Wildasin, David E, 1991. "Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 757-774, September.
    6. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March.
    7. Zodrow, George R. & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1986. "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 356-370, May.
    8. Wilson, John D., 1986. "A theory of interregional tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 296-315, May.
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