IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/rae/jouces/v78y2006p5-30.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

La concurrence fiscale entre communes est-elle plus intense en milieu urbain qu’en milieu rural ?

Author

Listed:
  • Aurélie Cassette

    () (MEDEE, Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales, Université des sciences et technologies de Lille, 59655 Villeneuve-d’Ascq)

  • Sonia Paty

    (MEDEE et CESAER-INRA, 26 bd du Docteur Petitjean, BP 87999, 21079 Dijon cedex)

Abstract

L’objet de cet article est de tester l’hypothèse selon laquelle l’intensité de la concurrence fiscale est plus forte en milieu urbain qu’en milieu rural. Dans ce but, nous construisons un modèle spatial de choix fiscal communal qui tient compte des choix fiscaux des communes concurrentes en matière de taxe professionnelle. Plus particulièrement, nous testons l’hypothèse de l’existence d’interactions fiscales au sein de différents groupements intercommunaux et nous en mesurons la forme et l’intensité à l’aide des techniques d’économétrie spatiale. Nous relions ensuite ces mesures d’intensité aux caractéristiques de l’aire étudiée, en particulier à son statut dans le zonage en aires urbaines et en aires d’emploi de l’espace rural (ZAU-ER). Nous concluons à l’existence d’interactions fiscales entre les communes appartenant à l’espace à dominante urbaine. En revanche, l’hypothèse d’interactions fiscales horizontales n’est pas vérifiée dans les communes appartenant à l’espace à dominante rurale.

Suggested Citation

  • Aurélie Cassette & Sonia Paty, 2006. "La concurrence fiscale entre communes est-elle plus intense en milieu urbain qu’en milieu rural ?," Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 78, pages 5-30.
  • Handle: RePEc:rae:jouces:v:78:y:2006:p:5-30
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/201679/2/78-5-30.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Anderson, John E. & Wassmer, Robert W., 1995. "The decision to 'bid for business': Municipal behavior in granting property tax abatements," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 739-757, December.
    2. Julie Le Gallo, 2002. "Économétrie spatiale : l'autocorrélation spatiale dans les modèles de régression linéaire," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 155(4), pages 139-157.
    3. Matthieu Leprince & Sonia Paty & Emmanuelle Reulier, 2005. "Choix d'imposition et interactions spatiales entre collectivités locales. Un test sur les départements français," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 71(1), pages 67-93.
    4. Wildasin, David E., 1988. "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 229-240, March.
    5. Saavedra, Luz Amparo, 1999. "A model of welfare competition with evidence from AFDC," ZEW Discussion Papers 99-27, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    6. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jacques Le Pottier & Yves Aragon, 1988. "Test de l'hypothèse démocratique dans les décisions budgétaires communales," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 39(2), pages 405-420.
    7. Anselin, Luc & Bera, Anil K. & Florax, Raymond & Yoon, Mann J., 1996. "Simple diagnostic tests for spatial dependence," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 77-104, February.
    8. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 52(2), pages 269-304, June.
    9. Hubert Jayet, 2001. "Econométrie et données spatiales - Une introduction à la pratique," Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 58, pages 105-129.
    10. Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1987. "The economics of the local public sector," Handbook of Public Economics,in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 11, pages 571-645 Elsevier.
    11. Salmon, Pierre, 1987. "Decentralisation as an Incentive Scheme," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 24-43, Summer.
    12. Heyndels, Bruno & Vuchelen, Jef, 1998. "Tax Mimicking Among Belgian Municipalities," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 51(1), pages 89-101, March.
    13. Mintz, Jack & Tulkens, Henry, 1986. "Commodity tax competition between member states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 133-172, March.
    14. Heyndels, Bruno & Vuchelen, Jef, 1998. "Tax Mimicking Among Belgian Municipalities," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 51(n. 1), pages 89-101, March.
    15. Lars P. Feld & Jean-Michel Josselin & Yvon Rocaboy, 2002. "Le mimétisme fiscal : une application aux Régions françaises," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 156(5), pages 43-49.
    16. Bertrand Schmitt, 2000. "Economic Geography and Contemporary Rural Dynamics: An Empirical Test on Some French Regions," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(8), pages 697-711.
    17. Bordignon, Massimo & Cerniglia, Floriana & Revelli, Federico, 2003. "In search of yardstick competition: a spatial analysis of Italian municipality property tax setting," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 199-217, September.
    18. Shroder, Mark, 1995. "Games the States Don't Play: Welfare Benefits and the Theory of Fiscal Federalism," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 77(1), pages 183-191, February.
    19. Case, Anne C. & Rosen, Harvey S. & Hines, James Jr., 1993. "Budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence : Evidence from the states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 285-307, October.
    20. Kelejian, Harry H & Prucha, Ingmar R, 1998. "A Generalized Spatial Two-Stage Least Squares Procedure for Estimating a Spatial Autoregressive Model with Autoregressive Disturbances," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 99-121, July.
    21. Jan K. Brueckner, 2003. "Strategic Interaction Among Governments: An Overview of Empirical Studies," International Regional Science Review, , vol. 26(2), pages 175-188, April.
    22. Wildasin, David E., 1989. "Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 193-212, March.
    23. Sole Olle, Albert, 2003. "Electoral accountability and tax mimicking: the effects of electoral margins, coalition government, and ideology," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 685-713, November.
    24. Helen F. Ladd, 1992. "Mimicking of Local Tax Burdens Among Neighboring Counties," Public Finance Review, , vol. 20(4), pages 450-467, October.
    25. Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 1998. "Existence of Nash equilibria in fiscal competition models," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 283-296, May.
    26. Federico Revelli, 2001. "Spatial patterns in local taxation: tax mimicking or error mimicking?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(9), pages 1101-1107.
    27. Hubert Jayet & Sonia Paty & Alain Pentel, 2002. "Existe-t-il des interactions fiscales stratégiques entre les collectivités locales," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 154(3), pages 95-105.
    28. Hoyt, William H., 1991. "Property taxation, Nash equilibrium, and market power," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 123-131, July.
    29. Wildasin, David E, 1991. "Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 757-774, September.
    30. Craig Brett & Joris Pinkse, 2000. "The determinants of municipal tax rates in British Columbia," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(3), pages 695-714, August.
    31. Anne Case, 1993. "Interstate tax competition after TRA86," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(1), pages 136-148.
    32. Matthieu Leprince & Alain Guengant, 2002. "Interactions fiscales verticales et réaction des communes à la coopération intercommunale," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 53(3), pages 525-535.
    33. Matthieu Leprince & Alain Guengant, 2002. "Interactions fiscales verticales et réaction des communes à la coopération intercommunale," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 53(3), pages 525-535.
    34. Zodrow, George R. & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1986. "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 356-370, May.
    35. Wilson, John D., 1986. "A theory of interregional tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 296-315, May.
    36. de Crombrugghe, Alain & Tulkens, Henry, 1990. "On Pareto improving commodity tax changes under fiscal competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 335-350, April.
    37. Brueckner, Jan K. & Saavedra, Luz A., 2001. "Do Local Governments Engage in Strategic Property-Tax Competition?," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 54(2), pages 203-230, June.
    38. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Quentin Frère & Matthieu Leprince & Sonia Paty, 2014. "The Impact of Intermunicipal Cooperation on Local Public Spending," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 51(8), pages 1741-1760, June.
    2. Thierry Madiès & Sonia Paty & Yvon Rocaboy, 2005. "Les stratégies fiscales des collectivités locales. De la théorie à la réalité," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 94(3), pages 283-315.
    3. Laurent Van Malderen & Marcel Gérard, 2012. "Tax Interaction Among Walloon Municipalities: Is There Room For Partisan Monopoly Effect?," ERSA conference papers ersa12p1051, European Regional Science Association.
    4. Marcel Gérard & Laurent van Malderen, 2012. "Tax Interaction among Walloon Municipalities: Is there Room for Yardstick Competition, Intellectual Trend and Partisan Monopoly Effect?," CESifo Working Paper Series 4025, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Johanna Choumert & Laure Cormier, 2011. "The provision of urban parks: an empirical test of spatial spillovers in an urban area using geographic information systems," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 47(2), pages 437-450, October.
    6. Houévoh Amandine R. Gnonlonfin, 2016. "An evaluation of French municipal solid waste pricing system," Working Papers 2016.18, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rae:jouces:v:78:y:2006:p:5-30. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Nathalie Saux-Nogues). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/inrapfr.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.