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Test de l'hypothèse démocratique dans les décisions budgétaires communales


  • Jean-Jacques Laffont
  • Jacques Le Pottier
  • Yves Aragon


[fre] Test de l'hypothèse démocratique dans les décisions budgétaires communales . . Le financement des dépenses communales peut être, jusqu'en 1980, assimilé à une décision unidimensionnelle concernant le nombre de centimes. Cet article propose une modélisation de ce choix par la règle majoritaire qui résulte en le meilleur choix de l'agent médian dans une population où l'on a distingué ceux qui payent et ceux qui ne payent pas la taxe professionnelle. Le modèle est estimé sur des données concernant l'agglomération toulousaine. L'hypothèse démocratique selon laquelle les deux catégories d'agents mentionnées ci-dessus ont le même poids dans les décisions communales est rejetée. [eng] Test of the democratic hypothesis in French communities . . The financing of local public expenditures can be viewed, until 1980, as a one dimensional choice. This paper proposes a model to formalize this choice based on the majority rule. It results in the best choice of the median agent in a population in which two types of citizens have been distinguished, those who pay and those who do not pay the « professional tax ». The model is estimated using data about the region of Toulouse, France. The democratic hypothesis according to which both types of agents mentioned above have the same weight in the decisions is rejected.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jacques Le Pottier & Yves Aragon, 1988. "Test de l'hypothèse démocratique dans les décisions budgétaires communales," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 39(2), pages 405-420.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1988_num_39_2_409070
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1988.409070

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Bergstrom, Theodore C & Goodman, Robert P, 1973. "Private Demands for Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 280-296, June.
    2. Comanor, William S., 1976. "The median voter rule and the theory of political choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1-2), pages 169-177.
    3. Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1979. "The elusive median voter," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 143-170, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Aurélie Cassette & Sonia Paty, 2006. "La concurrence fiscale entre communes est-elle plus intense en milieu urbain qu’en milieu rural ?," Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 78, pages 5-30.
    2. Hubert Jayet & Sonia Paty & Alain Pentel, 2002. "Existe-t-il des interactions fiscales stratégiques entre les collectivités locales," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 154(3), pages 95-105.

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