IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Les stratégies fiscales des collectivités locales. De la théorie à la réalité

  • Thierry Madiès
  • Sonia Paty
  • Yvon Rocaboy

The purpose of this article is to deal with the theoretical funding, the consequences and the empirical relevance of strategic tax interactions among governments. Theoretically, tax competition and yardstick competition models may explain the existence of horizontal interactions namely among similar types of local governments. In addition, vertical interactions may arise between two overlapping governments sharing the same tax base. Empirically, many articles provide evidence of the existence of such strategic interactions. Various solutions have been developed to reduce the induced inefficiencies.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=REOF_094_0283
Download Restriction: free

File URL: http://www.cairn.info/revue-de-l-ofce-2005-3-page-283.htm
Download Restriction: free

Article provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue de l'OFCE.

Volume (Year): 94 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 283-315

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:cai:reofsp:reof_094_0283
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-de-l-ofce.htm

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Hubert Jayet & Sonia Paty & Alain Pentel, 2002. "Existe-t-il des interactions fiscales stratégiques entre les collectivités locales," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 154(3), pages 95-105.
  2. Thierry Madiès & Bruno Ventelou, 2005. "Federalism in an endogenous growth model with tax base sharing and heterogeneous education services," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 84(1), pages 1-19, 03.
  3. Jean-Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano, 2003. "From economic to legal competition : New perspectives on European federalism," Post-Print halshs-00076679, HAL.
  4. Brueckner, Jan K. & Saavedra, Luz A., 2001. "Do Local Governments Engage in Strategic Property-Tax Competition?," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 54(n. 2), pages 203-30, June.
  5. Thierry Madiès & Sonia Paty & Yvon Rocaboy, 2005. "Externalités fiscales horizontales et verticales. Où en est la théorie du fédéralisme financier ?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 115(1), pages 17-63.
  6. Esteller-Moré, Álex & Solé-Ollé, Albert, 1999. "Vertical income tax externalities and fiscal interdependence: evidence from the US," ZEW Discussion Papers 99-28, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  7. Michael Keen, 1998. "Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(3), pages 454-485, September.
  8. Jeremy Edwards & Michael Keen, 1994. "Tax competition and Leviathon," IFS Working Papers W94/07, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  9. WILDASIN, David E., . "Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy," CORE Discussion Papers RP 831, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Wildasin, David E., 1988. "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 229-240, March.
  11. Bucovetsky, S., 1991. "Asymmetric tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 167-181, September.
  12. Parry, Ian, 2001. "How Large are the Welfare Costs of Tax Competition?," Discussion Papers dp-01-28, Resources For the Future.
  13. Bev Dahlby, 1996. "Fiscal externalities and the design of intergovernmental grants," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 3(3), pages 397-412, July.
  14. Emmanuelle Reulier & Yvon Rocaboy, 2005. "Comparaison des performances des élus ou mobilité des bases," Post-Print halshs-00010183, HAL.
  15. Matthieu LEPRINCE & Sonia PATY & Emmanuelle REULIER, 2005. "Choix d’imposition et interactions spatiales entre collectivités locales : un test sur les départements français," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2005013, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  16. Lars P. Feld & Jean-Michel Josselin & Yvon Rocaboy, 2002. "Le mimétisme fiscal : une application aux Régions françaises," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 156(5), pages 43-49.
  17. Lars P. Feld & Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2000. "Income Tax Competition at the State and Local Level in Switzerland," CESifo Working Paper Series 238, CESifo Group Munich.
  18. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1992. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick Competition," NBER Working Papers 4041, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Masayoshi Hayashi & Robin Boadway, 2001. "An empirical analysis of intergovernmental tax interaction: the case of business income taxes in Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 34(2), pages 481-503, May.
  20. Wilson, J.D., 1990. "Tax Competition With Interregional Differences In Factor Endowments," Working Papers 4, John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy.
  21. Hoyt, William H., 1991. "Property taxation, Nash equilibrium, and market power," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 123-131, July.
  22. Sole Olle, Albert, 2003. "Electoral accountability and tax mimicking: the effects of electoral margins, coalition government, and ideology," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 685-713, November.
  23. Federico Revelli, 2001. "Spatial patterns in local taxation: tax mimicking or error mimicking?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(9), pages 1101-1107.
  24. SALMON, Pierre, 1987. "Decentralization as an incentive scheme," Institut des Mathématiques Economiques – Document de travail de l’I.M.E. (1974-1993) 98, Institut des Mathématiques Economiques. LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
  25. Matthieu Leprince & Alain Guengant, 2002. "Interactions fiscales verticales et réaction des communes à la coopération intercommunale," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 53(3), pages 525-535.
  26. Timothy J. Besley & Harvey S. Rosen, 1999. "Vertical Externalities in Tax Setting: Evidence from Gasoline and Cigarettes," NBER Working Papers 6517, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  27. Michael J. Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2002. "Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High Taxes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 363-370, March.
  28. Aurélie Cassette & Sonia Paty, 2006. "La concurrence fiscale entre communes est-elle plus intense en milieu urbain qu’en milieu rural ?," Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 78, pages 5-30.
  29. Johnson, William R, 1988. "Income Redistribution in a Federal System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 570-73, June.
  30. Craig Brett & Joris Pinkse, 2000. "The determinants of municipal tax rates in British Columbia," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(3), pages 695-714, August.
  31. Hwang, Hae-shin & Choe, Byeongho, 1995. "Distribution of factor endowments and tax competition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 655-673, October.
  32. Bordignon, Massimo & Cerniglia, Floriana & Revelli, Federico, 2003. "In search of yardstick competition: a spatial analysis of Italian municipality property tax setting," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 199-217, September.
  33. Goodspeed, Timothy J., 2000. "Tax structure in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 493-506, March.
  34. Brennan, Geoffrey & Buchanan, James M., 1977. "Towards a tax constitution for Leviathan," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 255-273, December.
  35. Goodspeed, Timothy J., 1999. "Tax competition and tax structure in open federal economies: evidence from OECD countries with implications for the European Union," ZEW Discussion Papers 99-39, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  36. Rosanne Altshuler & Timothy J. Goodspeed, 2002. "Follow the Leader? Evidence on European and U.S. Tax Competition," Departmental Working Papers 200226, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  37. Oates, Wallace E., 1988. "On the measurement of congestion in the provision of local public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 85-94, July.
  38. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416.
  39. Matthieu Leprince & Thierry Madiès & Sonia Paty, 2007. "Business tax interactions among local governments : an empirical analysis of the French case," Post-Print halshs-00257446, HAL.
  40. Jean-Michel Josselin & Yvon Rocaboy & L.P. Feld, 2003. "Tax mimicking among regional juridictions," Post-Print halshs-00076681, HAL.
  41. Heyndels, Bruno & Vuchelen, Jef, 1998. "Tax Mimicking Among Belgian Municipalities," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 51(n. 1), pages 89-101, March.
  42. Zodrow, George R. & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1986. "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 356-370, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cai:reofsp:reof_094_0283. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.