Efficiency and the optimal direction of federal-state transfers
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00399907
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- Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 1996. "Efficiency and the optimal direction of federal-state transfers," IFS Working Papers W96/01, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
References listed on IDEAS
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Keywords
fiscal federalism; fiscal gap;Statistics
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