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Choix d’imposition et interactions spatiales entre collectivités locales : un test sur les départements français

  • Matthieu LEPRINCE

    (CREM, Université de Rennes 1)

  • Sonia PATY

    (MEDEE, IFRESI-CNRS, Université des Sciences et Technologies de Lille)

  • Emmanuelle REULIER

    (CREM, Université de Rennes 1)

L'objectif de cet article est de tester économétriquement l'existence d'interactions spatiales entre les choix d'imposition des départements français de métropole. Pour cela, un modèle de choix fiscal avec auto-régression spatiale est spécifié pour estimer la pente de la fonction de meilleure réponse qui relie le taux d'impôt d'un département aux taux votés par les départements voisins pour le même impôt. Nous montrons que pour l'année 1999, l'hypothèse d'interactions fiscales horizontales ne peut être rejetée pour trois des quatre impôts départementaux étudies, notamment pour la taxe professionnelle qui pèse uniquement sur les entreprises. À l'inverse, la fixation du taux départemental de la taxe d'habitation, qui pèse uniquement sur les ménages, ne semble pas gouvernée par les décisions des départements concurrents. Ces résultats sont compatibles à la fois avec les modèles de concurrence fiscale à la Wildasin (1988) et ceux de concurrence par comparaison à la Besley et Case (1995a).

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) with number 2005013.

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Length: 28
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2005013
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