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Externalités fiscales horizontales et verticales. Où en est la théorie du fédéralisme financier ?

  • Thierry Madiès
  • Sonia Paty
  • Yvon Rocaboy

Horizontal and vertical fiscal externalities Academic literature in public finance has recently focused on horizontal externalities coming from interjurisdictional tax competition ? namely among similar types of local governments ? and vertical externalities arising from interactions between two overlapping governments sharing the same tax base. The purpose of this paper is to provide a survey relating to both theoretical and empirical aspects of these two kinds of externalities that have strong implications for local government finance.

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Article provided by Dalloz in its journal Revue d'économie politique.

Volume (Year): 115 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 17-63

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Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_151_0017
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