National vs European incentive policies: Bargaining, information and coordination
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- B. Caillaud & R. Guesnerie & P. Rey & J. Tirole, 1988.
"Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
- Bernard Caillaud & Patrick Rey & Roger Guesnerie & Jean Tirole, 1987. "Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions," Working papers 472, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Bourgeon, Jean-Marc & Jayet, Pierre-Alain & Picard, Pierre, 1995. "An incentive approach to land set-aside programs," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 1487-1509, October.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "Federal Fiscal Constitutions. Part I: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," EPRU Working Paper Series 93-04, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1992. "Federal fiscal constitutions part 1: risk sharing and moral hazard," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 72, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Persson, T. & Tabellini, G., 1992. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions ; Part I: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," Papers 519, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Persson, T. & Tabellini, G., 1993. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions ; Part I: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 222.93, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1992. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions. Part I: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 728, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, B & Picard, P, 1995. "Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 621-646, May.
- Caillaud Bernard & Jullien Bruno & Picard Pierre, 1991. "Competing vertical structures : precommitment and renegotiation," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9125, CEPREMAP.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, January.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
- Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, "undated". "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 15-80, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Sanford J Grossman & Oliver D Hart, 2001. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000339, David K. Levine.
- Gilbert, Guy & Picard, Pierre, 1996. "Incentives and optimal size of local jurisdictions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 19-41, January.
- Sappington, David, 1983. "Limited liability contracts between principal and agent," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-21, February. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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