Federal Fiscal Constitutions ; Part I: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard
Inspired by the current European developments, we study equilibrium fiscal policy under alternative "federal" arrangements. Our model has two levels of government. Local policy redistributes across individuals and affects the probability of aggregate shocks, whereas federal policy shares international risk. Policies are chosen under majority rule. There is a tradeoff between risk-sharing and moral hazard: federal risk-sharing can induce local governments to enact policies that increase local risk. We analyze this tradeoff under alternative fiscal constitutions. In particular, we contrast a vertically ordered system like the EC with a horizontally ordered federal system like the US. These alternative arrangements create different incentives for policymakers and voters, and give rise to different political equilibria. Under appropriate institutions, centralization of functions and power can mitigate the moral hazard problem.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1992|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.iies.su.se/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jewitt, Ian, 1988. "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1177-90, September.
- Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1990.
"Voting on the Budget Deficit,"
4553030, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 1988. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," NBER Working Papers 2759, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alesina, Alberto F & Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," CEPR Discussion Papers 269, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Guido Tabellini & Alberto Alesina, 1988. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," UCLA Economics Working Papers 539, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Sachs, Jeffrey & Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, 1992.
"Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe from the United States,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
632, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Jeffrey Sachs, 1991. "Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe From the United States," NBER Working Papers 3855, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Wildasin, David E, 1990. "Budgetary Pressures in the EEC: A Fiscal Federalism Perspective," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 69-74, May.
- Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March.
- Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
- Bureau, Dominique & Champsaur, Paul, 1992. "Fiscal Federalism and European Economic Unification," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 88-92, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:stocin:519. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.