IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Relaciones fiscales entre el Distrito Especial de Bogotá y la Nación

Listed author(s):
  • Olga Lucía Acosta N.

    ()

  • Israel Fainboim

    ()

  • Catalina Gutiérrez S.

    ()

  • Blanca Cecilia Zuluaga D.

    ()

Registered author(s):

    “El presente artículo evalúa las relaciones fiscales entre el Distrito Especial de Bogotá y el Gobierno Nacional. El punto de partida de la investigación fue el siguiente interrogante formulado por las autoridades distritales: ¿está siendo discriminado el Distrito por la Ley 60 de 1993, dado que recibe de la Nación por concepto de transferencias mucho menos de 10 que le aporta a esta en impuestos? En sí misma la pregunta está mal formulada, pues las transferencias pueden tener como objetivo (entre otros) el de igualar los ingresos fiscales de las entidades territoriales, lo que implica que algunas entidades reciban transferencias en términos per cápita mucho mayores que otras y que en muchos casos las transferencias sean muy inferiores a las sumas que aportan en impuestos nacionales las comunidades locales. La pregunta correcta, que fue a la que respondimos en este estudio, es más bien si el régimen vigente de transferencias cumple los objetivos que se le han fijado, o que normalmente se espera que cumpla, como son los de igualar capacidades fiscales entre entidades, reducir inequidades de ingreso y corregir externalidades; o si aún con las transferencias se siguen manteniendo todavía inequidades e ineficiencias. Una segunda pregunta, relacionada con el mismo problema, para la cual tan solo indicamos posibles respuestas, mas no exploramos cuantitativamente su validez, es si aún cumpliendo los objetivos trazados, la distribución actual de los recursos de transferencias implica desequilibrios de tal magnitud entre los flujos que el Distrito entrega a la Nación y los que recibe a cambio, que pueden llegar a afectar el crecimiento económico de la capital.”

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11445/1782
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by FEDESARROLLO in its series COYUNTURA SOCIAL with number 013094.

    as
    in new window

    Length: 123
    Date of creation: 31 May 1999
    Handle: RePEc:col:000486:013094
    Contact details of provider:

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as
    in new window


    1. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "Federal Fiscal Constitutions. Part I: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," EPRU Working Paper Series 93-04, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    2. Pedro Nel Ospina & Catalina Gutiérrez, 1996. "Desempeño financiero de las entidades municipales 1993-1995," COYUNTURA ECONÓMICA, FEDESARROLLO, March.
    3. Shah, Anwar & DEC, 1994. "A fiscal needs approach to equalization transfers in a decentralized federation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1289, The World Bank.
    4. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "Federalism as a Commitment to Reserving Market Incentives," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 83-92, Fall.
    5. Richard A. Musgrave, 1997. "Devolution, Grants, and Fiscal Competition," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 65-72, Fall.
    6. Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1987. "The economics of the local public sector," Handbook of Public Economics,in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 11, pages 571-645 Elsevier.
    7. Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1997. "Rethinking Federalism," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 43-64, Fall.
    8. John D. Donahue, 1997. "Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and America's Devolution Debate," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 73-81, Fall.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:col:000486:013094. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lucía Fenney Pérez)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.