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Relaciones fiscales entre el Distrito Especial de Bogotá y la Nación

Author

Listed:
  • Olga Lucía Acosta N.
  • Israel Fainboim
  • Catalina Guti�rrez S.
  • Blanca Cecilia Zuluaga D.

Abstract

“El presente artículo evalúa las relaciones fiscales entre el Distrito Especial de Bogotá y el Gobierno Nacional. El punto de partida de la investigación fue el siguiente interrogante formulado por las autoridades distritales: ¿está siendo discriminado el Distrito por la Ley 60 de 1993, dado que recibe de la Nación por concepto de transferencias mucho menos de 10 que le aporta a esta en impuestos? En sí misma la pregunta está mal formulada, pues las transferencias pueden tener como objetivo (entre otros) el de igualar los ingresos fiscales de las entidades territoriales, lo que implica que algunas entidades reciban transferencias en términos per cápita mucho mayores que otras y que en muchos casos las transferencias sean muy inferiores a las sumas que aportan en impuestos nacionales las comunidades locales. La pregunta correcta, que fue a la que respondimos en este estudio, es más bien si el régimen vigente de transferencias cumple los objetivos que se le han fijado, o que normalmente se espera que cumpla, como son los de igualar capacidades fiscales entre entidades, reducir inequidades de ingreso y corregir externalidades; o si aún con las transferencias se siguen manteniendo todavía inequidades e ineficiencias. Una segunda pregunta, relacionada con el mismo problema, para la cual tan solo indicamos posibles respuestas, mas no exploramos cuantitativamente su validez, es si aún cumpliendo los objetivos trazados, la distribución actual de los recursos de transferencias implica desequilibrios de tal magnitud entre los flujos que el Distrito entrega a la Nación y los que recibe a cambio, que pueden llegar a afectar el crecimiento económico de la capital.”

Suggested Citation

  • Olga Lucía Acosta N. & Israel Fainboim & Catalina Guti�rrez S. & Blanca Cecilia Zuluaga D., 1999. "Relaciones fiscales entre el Distrito Especial de Bogotá y la Nación," Coyuntura Social 13094, Fedesarrollo.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000486:013094
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11445/1782
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Richard M Bird & Enid Slack, 2007. "An Approach to Metropolitan Governance and Finance," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 25(5), pages 729-755, October.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General

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