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Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and America's Devolution Debate

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  • John D. Donahue

Abstract

The market metaphor of intergovernmental choice as a spur to efficiency (formalized by Charles M. Tiebout) is often invoked to support the shift away from Washington and toward the states. But the model translates badly to governments; governmental entry and exit is costly. Public-sector co11usion often serves citizens' interests. Heterogeneous mobility distorts the signals sent by interstate migration. And while Tiebout (and followers) condition efficiency predictions on optimal distribution, the U.S. devolution movement coincides with rising inequality and has gone furthest where distribution matters most. The metaphor is misapplied. Devolution will likely do more to enfeeble government than to improve it.

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  • John D. Donahue, 1997. "Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and America's Devolution Debate," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 73-81, Fall.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:11:y:1997:i:4:p:73-81
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.11.4.73
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    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.11.4.73
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    9. Swenson, David & Deller, Steven C., 2001. "Devolution or Convolution? The Changing Relationship Between Federal, State and Local Governments," Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, Mid-Continent Regional Science Association, vol. 31(1), pages 1-27.
    10. Olga Lucía Acosta N. & Israel Fainboim & Catalina Gutiérrez S. & Blanca Cecilia Zuluaga D., 1999. "Relaciones fiscales entre el Distrito Especial de Bogotá y la Nación," Coyuntura Social 13094, Fedesarrollo.
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    17. Kraybill, David S. & Lobao, Linda, 2001. "The Emerging Roles of County Governments in Rural America: Findings from a Recent National Survey," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20697, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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